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Irrigated agriculture is facing growing uncertainties under Climate Change (CC) due to the 
decreased predictability of weather events and increased variability of climate patterns. The 
farmers’ and Water Authorities’ (WAs) climate-related uncertainties can be lowered by Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) through the provision of weather and climate forecasts. 
Despite the growing interest for such platforms and their potential to favor CC adaptation, we see 
many ICT-development initiatives having less-than-expected diffusion and failing to solve 
informational issues in the short term. This PhD thesis deeply investigated the uncertainty settings 
around the decisions on ICT-information implementation to support irrigation management. Its 
ambition is to provide evidences on: (i) the circumstances in which ICT can be reliably used; (ii) the 
relative potential benefits; (iii) the barriers in the decision environment or in the Decision Maker’s 
(DM) behavior which do not allow the achievement of such potential benefits. To do so, we defined 
an innovative uncertainty framing, distinguishing between elements of risk and ambiguity, and 
developed two separate decision models under uncertainty. One model allowed to estimate 
potential economic benefits from the ICT-informed decision process of irrigation management, 
while accounting for the restrictions to information usability. The other model represented 
subjective behavior in the decision on ICT-information implementation and highlighted how it can 
impact on ICT-benefits in irrigation districts. The capability of decision models was then tested in 
two separate empirical examples. Results confirmed the hypothesis on ICT potentials, but 
underlined that benefits are extremely variable and subjected to constraints. These are relative to 
the decision environment, to the form and quality of ICT-information and to the behavior of DMs. 
Conclusions provide policy suggestions to help irrigated agriculture unlocking ICT potentials, 
overcoming barriers to ICT-information implementation. Specifically, we highlight how ICT-
development policies, uncertainty-management policies and water policies are respectively needed 
to: (i) favor ICT development with end users to answer their information needs; (ii) help DMs facing 
risks caused by the imperfect nature of ICT-information; and (iii) ensure that excess-use of water 
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1.1 Background and motivations 
Agriculture has always been affected by uncertainty. This is mainly due to the open-air 
characteristic of production processes carried out in complex agroecosystems with highly variable 
driving elements such as pests, climate and soil. To face uncertainty, the development of agriculture 
has been characterized by farmers’ effort to control environmental variables (Hardaker et al. 2015). 
The result of this development process is in distributions of yields which have lower variability and 
higher averages. Water management and irrigation are a clear example of this. By collecting water 
in reservoirs before the cultivating season, water management allows to diminish the share of 
production processes subjected to the variability of unknown and upcoming rainfalls. By moving 
water from where it is abundant to the field, irrigation allows a more suitable environment for crops. 
Overall, the irrigation system lowers climate-vulnerability while it increases the average crop 
productivity (Galioto, Raggi and Viaggi 2017). Examples of this kind are available all along the 
development of agriculture from food gathering to hi-tech greenhouses. This is especially true 
during the Green Revolution, which is widely recognized as one of the periods where agriculture has 
been more effective in implementing innovations for the control of agroecosystem’s processes 
(Gingrich and Krausmann 2018). 
Nowadays, Climate Change (CC) is exacerbating uncertainty issues by making forecasts more 
difficult and by increasing the variability of weather events (Allen, Dube and Solecki 2018). At the 
same time, as in everyday life we have seen the proliferation of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) contributing to support many decisions, also agriculture is taking part to this 
digitalization process. Decision Support Systems, IoT, Climate Services and GIS are exponentially 
growing in the agricultural sector and offer Decision Makers (DMs) a wide variety of support 
(Cambra Baseca et al. 2019). Because of the great potential of such ICTs, many authors call this 
period Digital agriculture revolution and believe it is the answer to the challenges the sector is facing 
due to CC (Rotz et al. 2019). This title highlights how scholars consider important the stage of 
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agricultural development we are living in. 
While the Digital agriculture revolution can be expected to be comparable in magnitude with 
the Green Revolution (Rotz et al. 2019), the approach with which innovations contribute to the 
sector is radically different. During the Green Revolution technologies were aimed at altering the 
agroecosystem through fertilizers, pesticides and genetics, while the Digital agriculture revolution 
is altering the decision environment through information provision. Accordingly, all digital 
technologies in agriculture have one common element, which is in the use and generation of data. 
With it, the new platforms generate information aimed at supporting decisions by lowering 
uncertainty. Decision processes can now move from precautionary and inefficient choices forced by 
uncertainty, to decisions based on sound information. In this context, water management is one of 
the key sectors where ICT-information would have the most important applications with the highest 
benefits (Jeuland et al. 2018; Cambra Baseca et al. 2019).  
In the industrial and utility sectors, the adoption of ICT to support decisions on water use and 
allocation is already widespread in what is defined by the International Water Association as Digital 
water journey (Ceo, Foundry and Webb 2019). In agriculture, the Digital water journey is more 
difficult due to the intrinsic characteristics of the sector. Here, dynamics for ICT implementation are 
extremely complex and infrastructures, technical issues and low profitability pose significant 
constraints (Cavazza et al. 2018). As a result, in some occasions WAs and farmers might decide to 
not implement an ICT because it cannot be used, or it is not profitable, given the current settings 
(Galioto et al. 2020). For example, low accuracy of available devices make many platforms useless 
to aid farmers’ irrigation decisions (Galioto et al. 2017). At the level of Water Authorities (WAs) the 
prevalence of open-air canals does not always allow to precisely allocate water between farmers 
according to the ICT (Cavazza et al. 2018). Even when an ICT is profitable when used, behavioral 
barriers can hinder the digitalization process (Kirchhoff, Lemos and Engle 2013). Between these, 
aversion to the uncertainty involved in the implementation of a new ICT is the most relevant, with 
a key role played by the DM not knowing the ICT reliability. As a result, the digital transition for 
irrigation management cannot be self-accomplished by the sector. Constraints to digitalization will 
not only slow ICT implementation, but they also risk compromising ICT benefits in the long term, 
leaving the sector with few tools to face issues of CC-related scarcity and conflicting uses (Ceo et al. 
2019).  
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In the literature, there are several studies addressing the topic of ICT implementation in 
agriculture and water management (Jeuland et al. 2018; Meza, Hansen and Osgood 2008); many of 
these highlight the key role of ICT for CC-adaptation. Nevertheless, results are contradictory, and 
none provides a comprehensive assessment addressing, with a holistic approach, the whole decision 
environment. The most important works, estimate the benefits of ICT implementation by defining 
the circumstances in which information has a value for a DM (Keisler et al. 2014). Although scholars 
agree on the theoretical settings in which ICT-information is valuable, empirical applications show 
discordances and ICT-benefits are still unclear. This highlights how results are extremely context-
dependent and models must be adapted to the decision environment in which the ICT is introduced. 
Given the context-specificity of ICT-benefits, we carried out a review on ICT implementation for 
irrigation management both at the farm- and WA-level. Especially at the latter decision level, we 
found few or no work addressing the issue. In addition, there are gaps in the modelling of decisions 
to account for: (i) the specificities of the irrigation sector; (ii) the farmer’s and WA’s subjective 
behavior under the uncertainty affecting decisions for new ICT implementation. As briefly described 
in the previous paragraph, the irrigation sector is peculiar for its technical elements which constraint 
the range of applicability of ICT. Not accounting for these constraints brings to significant over-
estimations of benefits, which, in the long term, might further increase uncertainty on the 
convenience of ICT implementation. Other than technical constraints, one of the major issues 
highlighted in both qualitative and quantitative studies is that new ICT platforms generate 
uncertainty on information reliability. However, the DM’s behavior is often assumed as rational and 
aversion to uncertainty overlooked. Even in those applied studies which relax assumptions of 
rationality, different sources of uncertainty are treated indistinctly, and the issues generated by a 
lack of knowledge on ICT reliability are overlooked. This does not allow to model how perceptions 
on information reliability affect the farmer’s or WA’s behavior and, in turn, the decision on ICT 
implementation. Overall, uncertainty remains on the magnitude of benefits which can be achieved 
through ICT-aided decision processes in irrigated-agriculture and on what hinders the sector to such 
achievements.  
In this research, we acknowledge that ICT-information is not always profitable when 
implemented in the target decision processes (Galioto et al. 2020). As highlighted before, ICTs are 
promising tools, but in many occasions their development is shown to be unproductive due to a 
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wide variety of constraints. To help understanding the problem, we distinguish between two classes 
of constraints limiting ICT adoption and ICT-benefits in irrigated agriculture: 
• Restrictions to information usability: these occur when the ICT provides information that 
cannot be implemented, or it is not profitable when implemented in real-life irrigation 
management decisions. Such restrictions cannot be overcome because they are intrinsic 
characteristics of the decision environment. For example, some decisions can be so risky that 
precautionary strategies are always more profitable. More simply, it can happen that in the 
current management system there are not information needs or the current infrastructures 
or management systems do not allow ICT-information implementation. In presence of 
restrictions to information usability there are no potential economic benefits from ICT-
information implementation. 
• Barriers to the achievement of ICT-benefits: these can be due to characteristics of: (i) the 
ICT, like its form, content or time provision which are not compatible with the local decision 
process; (ii) the decision environment, like technical barriers, for example, the water delivery 
system can be too imprecise if compared with ICT-information; (iii) the DM himself, like 
aversion to uncertainty which might cause low expected utility from information 
implementation from ICTs whose reliability is unknown. Such barriers can be overcome by 
modifying ICT-information’s form or accuracy to meet DMs’ needs or by adapting decision 
processes or the decision environment to implement information. Behavioral barriers too 
can be solved by educating end users or by providing them information on ICT reliability. 
In this context, when approaching a new ICT, one must ask himself three questions: Are there 
any restriction undermining information usability? What are the potential benefits from the use of 
such information? Which are the barriers to the achievement of such benefits? At this end, the role 
of agricultural economists is key to fill the knowledge gaps and support policy makers to accompany 
irrigated agriculture in the Digital water journey. Specifically, there is a strong need to provide 
evidence on information usability, potential economic benefits from ICT and barriers to the 
achievement of such benefits. On the one hand, the assessment of information usability and ICT-
benefits will provide the needed data to justify and encourage investments and policies for ICT 
development in those settings where ICTs can be profitable when implemented. On the other hand, 
by assessing the barriers which hinder the achievement of such ICT benefits, it will be possible to 
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design policies tailored to overcome the problems. Overall, evidence would support policy makers 
in the design of new tools to guide irrigated agriculture in unlocking ICT potentials. To deliver this 
evidence, there must be advances in the modelling of decisions. The available literature should be 
improved by two kinds of model developments: (i) one is in designing a new decision model by 
adapting existing ones to the peculiarities of the sector; (ii) the other is in designing a new model 
capable of assessing the impacts that subjective behavior under uncertainty has in the process of 
new ICT implementation.  
1.2 Objectives 
This doctoral dissertation is positioned in the context above described, with the ambition of 
answering to the need of evidence on restrictions to ICT-information usability, ICT-benefits and 
barriers to ICT adoption in irrigation management. A holistic approach is used to analyze the 
decision processes and to account for the multiplicity of aspects which are peculiar in the sector’s 
decisions. To do so, decision models are required to simulate the DMs’ choices on ICT information 
implementation and their impacts on the irrigation activity. Therefore, behind the major objective 
of this dissertation, three sub-objectives can be identified, each contributing to design new methods 
which address specific issues of the bigger problem. In particular, the methodological sub-objectives 
can be described as follows, where to the fulfillment of each objective corresponds a specific 
chapter of this dissertation: 
1. To build the theoretical foundations for new behavioral decision models of ICT adoption 
under uncertainties in irrigation management: in applied studies we did not find the basis 
to support models capable of accounting for the peculiarities of decisions, so, in the 
economic literature, we sought for theories on which to build the framework needed to 
address the specific problems. 
2. To develop a new decision model to understand when ICT information is usable and to 
estimate potential economic benefits from the ICT-informed decision process of irrigation 
management while accounting for the barriers to information implementation. This model 
is applied to the water management decisions that occur at the WA-level and specifically 
accounts for technical barriers to the achievement of ICT benefits and restrictions for ICT-
information implementation.  
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3. To design a new behavioral decision model capable of representing the decision processes 
of ICT information implementation, while assessing the impacts that subjective behavior 
under uncertainty have in undermining ICT potentials in settings where ICT can be 
profitable when implemented. In literature no model was found to address the issues 
caused by lack of knowledge on ICT-information reliability, this model filled the knowledge 
gab by modelling aversion to such uncertainties and the relative barriers this behavior 
poses.  
The theoretical framework developed to fulfill objective 1, will define the specific aims and 
the background on which we will build the two models of objectives 2 and 3. Then, by developing 
such models we will provide a detailed representation of the major dynamics which condition the 
Digital water journey in agriculture. Finally, by testing and implementing the models to case studies 
we will provide the quantitative estimations of ICT impacts needed to support new policies to aid 
the sector.  
1.3 Novelties 
The research stands out of the current literature for its comprehensive approach with which 
decision processes are analyzed. In particular, the first novelty is in the theoretical framework 
developed to model the uncertainty settings around ICT adoption by distinguishing between the 
different sources of uncertainty involved in the implementation of a new ICT. Contrarily to most of 
applied studies where risk is considered to be the only element building uncertainty, we introduce 
the concept of ambiguity. This arises from a lack of knowledge on information reliability and 
expresses the degree of confidence the DM puts on the risk estimations provided by the ICT. The 
uncertainty framing proposed was made possible by the application of the theory of ambiguity 
developed by Ellsberg (1961) and it allows to model the process of familiarity which occurs as the 
DM gains experience on the ICT. Familiarity plays a key role in the ICT adoption decision as it favors 
uncertainty-averse DMs in ICT-information implementation. 
The novelty of the first decision model developed is in being capable of addressing technical 
constraints characterizing irrigation management at the WA level. Between these, the main 
methodological advancement is in accounting for the timing issues in sequential and inter-
correlated decision steps. Accordingly, one peculiarity of water allocation decisions is in the fact 
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that they are repeated before and along the irrigating season, with one decision having impacts on 
the outcome of the subsequent one. Further, decision variables, technical constraints and 
information requirements vary depending on the time of the season. The model developed accounts 
for such elements by considering two decision steps, the first occurring before the irrigating season, 
while the second is repeated weekly along the season. Because the decisions made in the second 
step are also influenced by the accuracy of ICT-information provided before the irrigating season, 
we model a strict dominance of the accuracy of ICT-information provided in previous time steps on 
subsequent ones. This issue was not tackled in literature and allowed to develop a new decision 
model by adapting the existing ones to the context of the study. The empirical application of the 
model is also original: to the best of author' knowledge no economic research deals with ICT 
adoption by WA for the management of irrigation. 
In the second model, novelties are twofold: (i) the first is in providing as output both the  
farmers’ and WAs’ water demand from ICT-aided irrigation plans; (ii) the second is in developing a 
new learning rule to describe how DMs get familiar with a new ICT as they gain new insights on its 
reliability. By considering water demand as function of DM’s behavior and by accounting for the 
governance system, the model highlights how poor coordination in water use can undermine ICT 
benefits. Previously, this issue was never raised by scholars; it is caused by subjective attitudes and 
perceptions on ICT reliability. Because perceptions evolve in time as DMs become familiar with the 
ICT, choices on water use will evolve too. To model such process, we did not find any suitable model 
to represent the update of beliefs on ICT reliability, therefore we developed a new one. The learning 
rule is innovative because it accounts for two main peculiarities of ICTs providing weather-related 
information: 
• differently from other technologies, the performance of ICT cannot be directly measured in 
terms of production; 
• accuracy of information is difficult to estimate at the end-user level because quantitative 
comparisons between forecasts and observations need specific tools and knowledge. 
Overall these modelling advancements allowed to assess the impact that subjective behavior 
on ICT implementation have in undermining the efficiency of ICT-aided irrigation plans in districts. 
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1.4 Overview  
The thesis is a combination of three individual papers, each building a single chapter and 
contributing to the understanding of specific aspects of the decision problems at hand. Overall, the 
papers will provide the picture needed to represent the key elements of decision process of ICT 
implementation and will analyze the problem in its complex and wide aspects.  
In the next chapter, we will analyze the economic literature to seek for theories of decision-
making under uncertainty capable of better explaining the problems of ICT-information 
implementation. Results of this chapter will build the theoretical foundation for the decision models 
of ICT-information implementation which will be developed in the subsequent chapters.  
In the third chapter, we will focus on ICT-information usability and benefits generated from 
ICT implementation. In particular, through a model based on Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT), we 
address ICT-information usability and estimate economic benefits from the ICT-informed decision 
process of water management in agriculture at the WA level. This is done by testing an applying the 
model to a case study represented by a WA which is implementing a new ICT platform developed 
to provide climate information to support irrigation. 
In the fourth chapter, we focus on the fact that it is not only information usability which 
affects its implementation and related benefits, but also the farmers’ and WA’s subjective behavior. 
To assess the impact of such issue, we develop a behavioral model to represent the decision 
between inefficient but riskless irrigation plans or ICT-aided efficient irrigation plans with uncertain 
outcomes. The model will allow to assess the impact that subjective behavior on ICT implementation 
have on the efficiency of ICT aided irrigation plans in irrigation districts. Then, the model is 
implemented in a numerical example to underline, in a scenario analysis, how poor governance can 
further hinder the achievement of ICT-benefits 
Finally, we provide the full descriptive analyses of the modelling results and the relative 




2. Towards a framework for comprehensive analysis of 
decision processes for ICT adoption in irrigation 
management 
2.1 Introduction and objectives 
In the previous chapter, we highlighted how uncertainty has always affected agriculture and 
how irrigation management is one of the areas mostly needing information to solve it. Information 
needs are further exacerbated under CC scenarios. Climate-related uncertainties could be lowered 
by weather and climate forecasts and disseminated to farmers and water authorities through ICT. 
Despite the growing interest for such technologies and their potential to favor adaptation, we see 
many ICT-development initiatives having less-than-expected diffusion and failing to solve 
informational issues in the short term. This is mainly due to technical barriers, which undermine 
information usability, and a lack of knowledge on ICT reliability, which undermines information 
implementation. The latter barrier is true even in settings where otherwise ICT would have allowed 
significant benefits.  
Here we do not want to highlight the usefulness of ICT, contrarily, knowing their potential 
key role for CC adaptation (Allen et al. 2018), we see a strong need to understand decision processes 
in ICT-information implementation. To do so, we will analyze the economic literature to seek for 
theories of decision-making under uncertainty capable of better explaining the problem. Results will 
build the theoretical foundation for decision models of ICT-information implementation which will 
simulate decisions for irrigation management. This will help to understand how barriers to the 
achievement of potential economic benefits can be better overcame. Moreover, it will allow ICT 
developers in tailoring platforms to answer DMs’ information needs and policy makers in defining 
uncertainty-management policies.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we will frame the 
problem and describe how uncertainty rise due to CC, the role of ICT in CC-adaptation and the gaps 
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between expectation and real ICT implementation. Then, we will review the most relevant theories 
and applications of decision making under uncertainty. In Section 2.4, we will focus on the theory 
developed by Ellsberg (Ellsberg 1961) and apply it to the context of our research; finally in Section 
2.5 and 2.6 we respectively discuss what we have learned from this review and draw conclusions 
and policy implications. 
2.2 Climate Change and uncertainty 
Due to the open-air characteristic of farming activities, agriculture has long been recognized 
to be one of the most weather sensitive sectors (Hardaker et al. 2015). Farmers have always faced 
their susceptibility to weather events, but recent CC trends are posing further obstacles in their 
activities prompting two main issues: (i) a raise in the frequency of extreme events and (ii) a raise in 
the variability of weather patterns. This results in an increased vulnerability of agriculture and rural 
areas (H. de Coninck et al. 2018). 
The former issue of increased frequency of extreme events corresponds to a fattening in the 
tails of the climate-events’ probability distributions. Tail-events generate losses despite the side of 
the climate distribution considered because large deviations from mean (or expected) values have 
often negative effects on yields (Hardaker et al. 2015). For example, both droughts and excessive 
rainfalls are negative for agricultural production and one does not compensate for the other. This 
results in an increased frequency of climate-related losses which can only be mitigated, if predicted, 
by implementing protective actions. Because these actions are costly and predictions are seldomly 
available at a sufficient level of accuracy to be reliably used (Cavazza et al. 2018), climate shocks are 
always welfare-reducing events.  
With regards to the raise in weather patterns’ variability, it is to be said that variability per 
se is not negative for agricultural production (Hallstrom 2004). For example, seasonal variability is 
taken as an advantage for agricultural systems in temperate areas and experience in seasonal 
fluctuations is used by farmers to predict upcoming trends and act consequently (Letson and Solı 
2013). The problem arises when variability is unpredictable (Hansen 2002). This is typically the case 
of CC where the change in climate trends means that past records are less relevant in making future 
predictions and climate models propose different projections (H. de Coninck et al. 2018). As a result, 
unpredicted climate variability due to CC is systematically causing production losses in agriculture. 
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In this scenario, irrigation is an important tool which farmers can use to protect themselves 
from: (i) climate shocks, such as droughts, and (ii) climate variability, in the form of high variances 
in rainfall patterns. Accordingly, irrigation is recognized to be one of the most effective means to 
decrease climate-vulnerability of agricultural production (Skarbø and Vandermolen 2014; McCarl 
and Hertel 2018) and irrigation efficiency is fundamental to allow adaptation (H. de Coninck et al. 
2018). Apparently, this is in contrast with the fact that, between agricultural systems, irrigated 
agriculture is one of the most vulnerable to climate-related uncertainties (Archibald and Marshall 
2018). However, in semi-arid and Mediterranean areas, irrigation is already rooted in production 
systems, hence, no access to the resource can compromise the whole farming activity (Calzadilla et 
al. 2014). Here, climate shocks affect the short-term irrigation water activities and uncertain climate 
trends pose constraints in the long-term water supply and resource availability. This might result in 
yields of irrigated crops being lower on average and more variable (Galioto et al. 2017).  
In this framework, the most relevant role is played by WAs, which see the need to solve 
climate uncertainty in their water allocation activities (Kirchhoff et al. 2013; Cavazza et al. 2018). 
Their objective is to maximize farm revenues in the basin they are managing, while minimizing water 
use and the related costs. The main issues WAs are facing are related with the availability and 
management of the resource (Li et al. 2016), inability to meet the target farmers’ demand (Archibald 
and Marshall 2018) and missed water savings due to unpredicted rains (Archibald and Marshall 
2018). As a result, WAs are extremely sensitive to uncertainty, needing to plan water allocation now 
to accomplish future and uncertain climate settings (Giupponi 2014). 
2.2.1 Information provision and ICT adoption in Climate Change adaptation 
The common element of both CC-related issues above described is linked with uncertainty 
on future climate events: if climate shocks could be better anticipated, farmers and WAs would 
protect themselves; if future climate trends could be known, farmers and WAs would tailor 
production systems to fit future settings. In this context, meteorological sciences can provide 
forecasts of climate fluctuations and decrease the level of climate-uncertainty (Hansen 2002). With 
such information DMs would be better equipped in CC adaptation (World Metereological 
Organization 2015). Accordingly, in presence of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of alternative 
climate states, forecasts have the potential of reducing variance in the upcoming events’ probability 
distributions (Meza et al. 2008).  
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In parallel with the development of forecasts capability, ICTs are continuously growing and, 
by providing climate information, are potentially helpful in favoring adaptation. For this reason, ICTs 
are considered as strategic to aid decisions under climate uncertainty in agriculture (Crean et al. 
2015) and in water management (Kirchhoff et al. 2013). The integration of ICT-information in 
decision processes can help irrigating farmers achieving water savings and higher yields with lower 
variances (Galioto et al. 2017). Further, if also used by WAs, ICT can provide the information needed 
to implement efficient irrigation management plans capable of delivering farmers the right amount 
of water at the right time (O’Mahony et al. 2016). A specific potential is then identified at the WA 
level where such tools would help mitigating agricultural losses from climate shocks and climate 
variability (Cavazza et al. 2018). This is why there is a strong need for policies to favor the 
development and uptake of ICT for water management in agriculture (Irrigants d’Europe 2018; 
Giupponi 2014). 
2.2.2 State of the art in ICT adoption 
The topic of ICT adoption in agriculture is of growing relevance and numerous ICT 
development initiatives have been carried out to aid the sector (Aker et al. 2016). Despite being a 
niche in this field, the use of such technologies for water/irrigation management is considered one 
of the most promising applications (Jeuland et al. 2018). This is confirmed by the growing body of 
articles published on the topic (Figure 1) and by the interest in the applied economic literature 
(Jeuland et al. 2018; Martin 2016; Giupponi 2014). 
 





























Source: own elaboration from data obtained with the search in Scopus (dated 04/04/2019) having the following parameters: TITLE-
ABS-KEY ((ICT OR DSS OR "climate services”) AND agriculture AND ( "water management" OR  irrigation)) 
Regardless the great interest for ICT, in many cases their impact is not well-defined and 
results of applied economic studies are extremely variable (Aker et al. 2016). ICT can provide 
benefits only if information delivered is eventually implemented by DMs to improve decisions 
(Vogel, Letson and Herrick 2017). As evident, this occurs only when information content answers 
DMs’ needs (Furman et al. 2011) and its form is compatible with technical restrictions, such as 
timeliness of information provision or spatial scale (Vogel et al. 2017). It is not only information 
usability which conditions ICT-benefits; DM’s behavior can strongly affect ICT-information 
implementation. Tumbo et al. (Tumbo et al. 2018) in their analyses found that farmers in Tanzania 
are seeking ICT-information to adapt to CC, especially in their irrigation activities. Though, they 
highlight that uncertainty on ICT reliability can limit information uptake. Nesheim et al. (Nesheim, 
Barkved and Bharti 2017) found that the use of ICT in India has not reached its potential and many 
farmers do not implement the forecast received. This is mainly due to farmers not understanding 
information received or having doubts on ICT reliability (Nesheim et al. 2017). Kirchoff et al. 
(Kirchhoff et al. 2013) carried out qualitative and quantitative analyses on ICT adoption for water 
management in the U. S. and Brazil. They found that, when DMs perceived information reliable, this 
helped information uptake and efficient water management; while, in case of skepticism, 
information was not implemented (Kirchhoff et al. 2013). Hawoth et al. (Haworth et al. 2018) 
underline that, between all the 27 ICT reviewed, only a few were actually used to improve decisions. 
They identify restrictions for ICT-information implementation, between which the most relevant 
ones are associated with information quality and perceived reliability. Lack of knowledge on the 
technology’s reliability is an issue highlighted also by O’Mahony et al. (O’Mahony et al. 2016) who 
show that it can prevent achieving sustainable water management practices in Australian 
agriculture. Accordingly, if the ICT or the information itself are considered unreliable or are mis-
interpreted, DMs do not implement the message received and gain no benefit from the technology 
(Aker et al. 2016).  
Such findings are confirmed by several quantitative studies, out of which a selection of 
empirical application for ICT benefits estimations is reported in Table 1. As can be seen from the 
table, benefits can get null and every paper highlight elements of the decision environment or the 
information itself which prevent ICT-information implementation. Although the table is not 
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comprehensive of all the work done in the field, it allows to understand how the impact of ICT-
information implementation is still mixed. To gain better insights from this topic, please refer to the 
works of Jeuland et al. and Meza et al. (Jeuland et al. 2018; Meza et al. 2008) which provide 
respectively reviews of studies for ICT-information benefits estimation in water management 
(predominantly irrigation) and in the broader agricultural sector.  
This situation in which not all the DMs who receive information actually implement it, and 
both technical, but most of all, behavioral barriers undermine information implementation, brings 
to unclear settings. Further, even when ICT information is implemented and put into actions, 
quantitative studies highlight that in many occasions there is a lack of benefits from ICT-aided 
decision processes. This poses constraints for ICT development and growth because investments 
are not easily justifiable and returns doubtful (Jeuland et al. 2018).   
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Table 1: Examples of estimation of benefits from information implementation 
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2.3 Behavioral approaches to uncertainty 
In the words of Machina and Siniscalchi “Almost by its very nature, the phenomenon of 
uncertainty is ill-defined” (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). This is clear after considering the number 
of theories developed to frame the problem; often one theory is in discordance with the other. In 
this chapter we aim at providing a short review of the major theories explaining decision making 
under uncertainty to build the context in which we will develop the modelling foundations to 
achieve our objectives. 
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2.3.1 Perceptions and attitudes 
Decisions are affected by the DM’s behavioral perspective with a relevant role played by 
attitudes toward uncertainty (Letson et al. 2009). In every decision under uncertainty, risk is 
involved and aversion to it might cause DMs to sacrifice part of their revenues to lower the 
variability of uncertain outcomes (Meza et al. 2008). This is confirmed by An-Vo et al (An-Vo et al. 
2019) for the irrigating sector, where uncertainty leads to the implementation of inefficient 
precautionary actions. Information provision could lower the unpredicted climate variability and 
allow uncertainty averse DMs to relax protective actions and increase their expected utility. But this 
is not always true and, depending on the source, a new piece of information could even raise 
outcomes variability under the DM’s perspective (Yokota and Thompson 2004). The topic of 
information implementation and aversion to uncertainty is widely debated in literature. Abbas et 
al. (Abbas et al. 2013) found that more uncertainty averse DMs will gain higher benefits in terms of 
utility from information, but this monotonous relation fails if the assumption of perfect information 
is released. A relevant contribution to the topic is given by Smith and Ulu (Smith and Ulu 2017) who 
showed a series of scenarios where uncertainty averse DMs did or did not seek for a new piece of 
information. He concludes that the relation between benefits from receiving a new piece of 
information and the degree of aversion to uncertainty is very situation dependent.  
Besides attitudes toward uncertainty, the perception of uncertainty in itself is extremely 
important in affecting decisions for ICT adoption (Nesheim et al. 2017) and perceived uncertainty 
over forecasts reliability is found to be limiting information uptake (An-Vo et al. 2019). One strategy 
proposed to solve this uncertainty is in the estimation of the forecast reliability and in the 
incorporation of this information in the message itself (Kusunose and Mahmood 2016). This is 
commonly done with probabilistic climate forecasts, but still DMs could doubt on the probability 
estimation in itself. This explains one of the reasons why DM’s beliefs are needed to be accounted 
for in decision analyses (Hardaker and Lien 2010). Nevertheless, in literature important challenges 
remain in understanding the role of perceptions and attitudes (Jeuland et al. 2018) and most of the 
studies in applied economics make relevant behavioral assumptions to overcome the issue 
(Bobojonov et al. 2016). This gap in applied economics motivated us to seek for theories in the 
broader economic literature to understand the problem.  
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2.3.2 Toward a framework for uncertainty modelling 
To solve the relation between uncertainty aversion, perceptions and information 
implementation, a better picture of what uncertainty is built of is needed. Useful insights can be 
gained from decision theories developed in the economic literature and describing decision making 
under uncertainty. 
The representation of preferences over uncertain actions meaning actions whose payoff is 
dependent on the emergence of uncertain states, is firstly addressed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). They developed the Bernoullian (Bernoulli 
1954) concept of expected utility and outlined the dominant theory to describe attitudes toward 
uncertainty (Hardaker and Lien 2010). The theory is defined on the basis of the following four 
axioms: 
• A1 – Completeness: every state of the world involved in a decision can be completely ranked. 
• A2 – Transitivity:  the property of transitivity holds for preferences for alternative states. 
• A3 – Independence: preferences for alternative states are context independent. 
• A4 – Continuity: preferences for alternative states are expressed on a nominal scale. 
By holding these four axioms, a wide variety of utility functions have been developed in 
literature to represent DM’s preferences under uncertainty (Hardaker et al. 2015). The common 
characteristic of all von Neuman-Morgenstern’s utility functions is that concave functions represent 
an uncertainty aversion behavior, while if linear or convex, neutrality or love for uncertainty are 
modelled respectively. 
With regards to the representation of perceptions over uncertainty, the first theory 
considered in this research is the one proposed by Knight (Knight 1921). He was the earliest who 
gave a complete picture of uncertainty. His main contribution was in distinguishing between: (i) 
measurable uncertainty, occurring when the statistical frequencies of events are known to the DM 
and (ii) un-measurable uncertainty when they are not. The former uncertainty was defined as pure 
risk, while the concept of un-measurable uncertainty remained unclear (Machina and Siniscalchi 
2014). Even Knight in his work considered the fact that under un-measurable uncertainty DMs 
formed subjective “probability estimates” and treated them as risk. Accordingly, he postulated that 
“there is no difference for conduct between a measurable risk and an unmeasurable uncertainty”. 
 32 
The idea of subjective probabilities was further developed by Keynes (Keynes 1921) and Ramsey 
(Ramsey 1926) who both contributed to the formulation of the concept of “degrees of belief” 
representing the DMs’ rational probabilistic estimation in condition of un-measurable uncertainties. 
Because they, and the vast literature following, recognized that most of the decisions were 
characterized by the absence of measurable frequencies; the concept of subjective probabilities had 
a large success. This is especially true after Savage (Savage 1954) built on it the theory of Subjective 
Expected Utility (SEU). Savage defined a theory of decision making under uncertainty characterized 
by preferences over acts with uncertain outcomes being compliant of 7 axioms, out of which the 
most studied ones are described as follows: 
• A1 – Complete ordering: there is a preference relation over uncertain actions which is 
complete, reflexive and transitive. 
• A2 – Sure-Thing principle: the preference relation over two uncertain actions is not affected 
by their payoffs in states where both actions have the same payoff. 
• A3 – State-wise monotonicity: in a given state, one action is preferred to another if and only 
if their payoff is equally ordered. 
• A4 – Independence between payoffs and probabilities: given preferences between payoffs, 
the choice between two uncertain actions is not affected by the value of the payoffs. 
When representing choices under uncertainty, the SEU model developed by Savage allowed 
to distinguish between subjective probability and preferences. Often, these take the form of a von 
Neumann-Morgernstern’s (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) utility function. The SEU 
generated from an action whose state-dependent payoff is 𝑓(𝑠), takes the following expectational 
form (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014) (Eq. 1): 
𝑉(𝑓(𝑠)) = ' 𝑢)𝑓(𝑠)*𝑑𝜋(𝑠)- ≡ 𝔼0(1)𝑢 ∘ 𝑓(𝑠) 
Eq. 1 
Where S describes the state space and elements of S (state of the world, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) represent all 
the possible realizations of uncertainty; 𝑢(•) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and 𝜋(𝑠) is the subjective probability on S. The practical implication of the theory is that the DM builds 
probabilistic representations of states and uses these linearly by weighting uncertain payoffs. With 
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the application of the theory, observed decisions under uncertainty can be used to assess DM’s 
beliefs (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). This is true even in presence of measured frequencies where 
the DM might doubt their reliability and assuming that they will represent future likelihoods is a 
subjective judgment per se (Hardaker and Lien 2010). 
Despite the great success of SEU, there have been applications that showed some of its 
limitations. Between these, Allais (Allais 1953) highlighted that, even with objective lotteries, 
preferences are context-dependent and, in some cases, the von Neuman-Morgernstern’s 
independence axiom did not hold. In turn, Ellsberg  (Ellsberg 1961) showed exceptions of Savage 
postulates in describing perceptions. Finally, Kanemann (Kahneman et al. 1979), by developing 
prospect theory, presented that often both preferences and perceptions did not follow von 
Neuman-Morgernstern’s and Savage’s axioms respectively. Other theories describing perceptions 
and preferences have been developed in literature, but here are cited just the most significant for 
clear space limits. 
2.4 Ambiguity and ICT-information implementation 
Because every exception to the SEU theory tend to be specific to the uncertain prospect 
considered, in this work we believe that the settings described by Ellsberg (Ellsberg 1961) are the 
ones most powerful in representing the uncertainty environment affecting decision processes for 
ICT-information implementation. In the following sections we will briefly describe the theory of 
ambiguity developed by Ellsberg and the ample literature following him as well as the motivations 
which prompted us to argue that this theory can provide the foundations for developing a model to 
fill the knowledge gap around the drivers for ICT-information implementation. 
2.4.1 The theory of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion 
In 1961, during his PhD studies, Daniel Ellsberg reconsidered Knight’s distinction of 
uncertainty. In his work he focused on un-measurable uncertainties to show important exceptions 
to the Savage axioms which impaired the capability of SEU to represent decisions. He considered a 
series of thought experiments, out of which, the most famous is the one involving two urns. There 
is a transparent urn with observable content of 50 red and 50 black balls and another opaque urn 
with the same amount of balls, but with unknown ratio between the two colors. While in the 
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transparent urn the DM faces a situation of pure risk, because probabilities are observable and 
measurable; the bet in the opaque urn is different because such measurement is not possible. To 
describe the opaque urn’s content (hence the probability of a specific ball’s color) hundred 
combinations between red and black balls are possible. This raises uncertainty over which 
combination is the one really describing the urn’s content. 
In such settings, Ellsberg considered that most of the DMs would have preferred to place a 
bet on the ball’s color from a draw in the transparent urn, instead of a draw from the urn with 
unknown balls’ ratio. For a given prize in the bet, he proved that this choice cannot only be driven 
by a mere difference in subjective probabilities. Rather, the preference to bet on the transparent 
urn and, in general, the preference for gambles with known probabilities, is driven by a behavioral 
phenomenon called AA. The concept of AA is similar to RA, where ambiguity is identified as: 
“the nature of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events... a quality 
depending on the amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s 
degree of ‘confidence’ in an estimation of relative likelihoods.” (Ellsberg 1961). 
Or, in the words of Camerer and Weber (Camerer and Weber 1992), ambiguity is more clearly 
defined as “uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is relevant and could 
be known”. Overall, similarly to what Knight did, uncertainty is then characterized by two elements: 
(i) risk, represented by the share of measurable uncertainty or estimated trough subjective 
probabilities, and (ii) ambiguity, expressing the degree of confidence over these probability 
estimations. 
Because ambiguity affects a large share of decisions under uncertainty, there have been 
several experimental studies showing its relevance in decision making. Results highlight that AA 
impacts are comparable with, if not higher than, RA (Cubitt, van de Kuilen and Mukerji 2018). 
Further, these studies showed that AA is the major preference behavior of DMs under ambiguity, 
because DMs dislike situations where more than one probability estimation is possible (Etner, Jeleva 
and Tallon 2012). The presence of ambiguity in probability estimations, even if subjective, is in itself 
an exception to the Savage’s postulates. Moreover, AA implies that decisions do not only reveal 
subjective probabilities, but also relative preferences for expected outcomes. There are situations, 
such as in the urns’ examples (and, as described later, in ICT-information implementation), in which 
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we need to distinguish between the two elements of uncertainty to understand DM’s behavior. In 
these situations, SEU models cannot be applied straightforwardly but ambiguity sensitive 
preferences have to be accounted for.  
2.4.2 Ambiguity and ICT-information 
The capability of the theory developed by Ellsberg to provide a complete picture of the 
elements building uncertainty explains its large adoption in different decision problems (Machina 
and Siniscalchi 2014). In the majority of decisions, DMs have to cope with a certain level of risk and 
ambiguity. The latter expresses the degree of confidence the DM puts on the former (Visschers 
2017). This situation is typical with decisions under CC (Koundouri et al. 2017). Here, probabilistic 
distributions built with past records are doubted to be representing future climate trends and 
different models propose different projections. Ambiguity can be found in climate forecasts too. 
Uncertainty in forecasts is characterized by two elements: (i) the intrinsic variability of climate 
events, represented by probability distributions and (ii) the uncertainty about the forecast itself 
(World Metereological Organization 2015). The first uncertainty can be expressed as risk, over 
which, the second uncertainty emerges because the DM does not know whether the forecast is 
reliable. This lack of knowledge raise ambiguity because several forecasts could be delivered and 
the DM is not sure whether the one received is really representing future states. One common way 
to deal with such complex uncertainty settings in forecasts is through uncertainty folding (Allen and 
Eckel 2012). It consists in folding ambiguity with risk to obtain a single probability estimate used as 
input in SEU models. Though the method is quite simple, it has been shown by Allen (Allen and Eckel 
2012) to fail in representing real decision making with important informational losses. 
As with forecasts information, ambiguity rises even with the adoption of new technologies 
(Engle-Warnick and Laszlo 2017). When a DM is faced with a new technology, he is uncertain on the 
probability of such technology to be good performing. In this context, even if the DM has 
expectations or information from the developer, neither of the two probability estimations can be 
reliably assessed. As a result, in the first stages of a new technology, AA has the potential to strongly 
limit its diffusion. Only after having gained enough experience with the new technology, prior 
expectations can be confirmed or rejected and ambiguity solved in a learning process (Barham et 
al. 2015). Most of the applied economic literature consider ambiguity generated by new 
technologies to be risk, thereby losing precious DM’s behavioral insights (Ross, Santos and Capon 
 36 
2012). If risk and ambiguity are treated as one, risk-averse and ambiguity-averse DMs would behave 
equally. Both would be less prone in experimenting new technologies or implementing new forecast 
information, but this does not always happen. A new technology could be risk-reducing but 
ambiguous, or the opposite, it is possible to gain information reducing ambiguity but not risk 
(Nocetti 2018). In this complex framework, Snow (Snow 2010) defined the relation between 
information value and AA, where information reducing ambiguity is always sought by AA individuals, 
and the benefits from its implementation rise with the degree of aversion. The same applies with 
information reducing risk and RA. But while information solving ambiguity is valued only by AA DMs, 
if information solving risk completely disclose states of the world, its benefits rise with both AA and 
RA (Snow 2010). These phenomena are extremely important in the context of new technology 
adoption. If a new technology reduces the variability of outcomes, it is risk-decreasing but, as said 
before, it might raise ambiguity. Here, RA plays in favor of the technology, while AA might limit its 
implementation.  
2.5 Discussion: lessons learned from literature and implications for 
further research 
The complex nature of uncertainty has been widely analyzed in the economic literature’s 
history. In the previous sections we have considered just a small share of theories developed to 
better understand the various behavioral aspects of decision making under uncertainty. Between 
these, the one of AA is considered the most useful to understand the behavior of forecast 
implementation (Allen and Eckel 2012) or new technology adoption (Barham et al. 2014). Innovative 
technologies are frequently raising ambiguity either because the probability of a good performance 
is uncertain or, as in the case of ICT-climate-information, because they provide probabilistic 
information whose reliability is unknown. A new platform developed to deliver climate forecasts to 
DMs can be considered risk reducing because it lowers the variance in the upcoming climate states’ 
distribution. If so, it is always positively valued and implemented by RA DMs, given technical barriers 
are overcame. All the same, the DM does not know if the platform (hence the piece of information 
received) is reliable. This might raise ambiguity and is discouraging AA individuals to implement ICT-
information until they do not gain enough information, or even better experience, on the 
technology’s reliability. Accordingly, with experience the DM would learn if the technology is 
reliable and solve ambiguity (Gars and Ward 2019). The phenomenon is identified as familiarity with 
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a technology and might allow AA individuals to implement information received. While risk is often 
intrinsic to the technology and can hardly be modified, by providing ambiguity-reducing information 
or allowing DMs experience with the ICT, even AA individuals might find benefits from information.  
The approach proposed to deal with uncertainty in ICT adoption is expected to be capable of 
providing the required framing for applied models aiming at further deepening the issue of low ICT-
information implementation. The main limitation of the results of this review is in the absence of a 
practical example with which to test the framework developed. Further research is suggested on 
the topic, especially focusing on modelling application of ambiguity sensitive preferences. In this 
field, theoretical alternatives are proposed (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). Between these, the 
smooth ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (Klibanoff, Marinacci and 
Mukerji 2005) is considered the best performing in accounting for AA and RA behavior (Machina 
and Siniscalchi 2014). It allows the separation between perceptions and attitudes, both with 
reference to risk and ambiguity. This would permit comparing the condition of ICT-information 
implementation when the DM is uncertain on its reliability and after he has gained enough 
experience on the technology’s reliability. In such settings, uncertainty will be firstly made by risk 
and ambiguity, then, with experience, ambiguity vanishes, and risk remains unaltered.  
2.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
In this chapter we started underlining the need for climate information to favor irrigated 
agriculture in CC adaptation. At this end ICTs are recognized to be one of the most promising tool 
to aid the sector (H. de Coninck et al. 2018). Through a brief review of applied economic studies, we 
highlighted a lack of success of many ICT-development initiatives (Vogel et al. 2017). Technical 
barriers undermine information implementation and benefits from ICT-aided decision processes are 
unclear and extremely variable. This poses constraints for ICT development and growth because 
investments are not easily justifiable and returns doubtful (Jeuland et al. 2018).  
Other than technical barriers, one of the major issues highlighted in both qualitative and 
quantitative studies is that new ICT platforms generate uncertainty on information reliability. 
Because of this, DMs’ behavior appears to be strongly limiting ICT-information implementation, but 
the topic remains to be deepened. Accordingly, we found no study in the applied economic 
literature to be addressing this issue and providing the needed theoretical support to model 
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behavior in ICT-aided decisions. To face this problem, we sought for support in the wider economic 
literature. Here, many theories have been developed, but the one considered to best fit with our 
uncertainty settings is the one of AA developed by Ellsberg (Ellsberg, 1961). With it, we framed 
uncertainty and explained why ambiguity and AA are key elements in describing the issue of low 
rates in new ICT-information implementation. Our approach is different from most of applied 
studies where RA is considered to be the only behavioral driver for technology adoption and 
different sources of uncertainty are treated indistinctly. Because ICT are peculiar technologies 
providing information capable of reducing risk but raising ambiguity, AA need to be analyzed to 
better explain the process of ICT-information implementation. Accordingly, since the reliability of 
new platforms is uncertain, an AA behavior can impede DMs in implementing ICT-information. Key 
role is played by a DM experiencing with the new technology without necessarily need to buy 
information received or put information into actions at his own risk. This would help WAs or farmers 
to learn whether the ICT provided is reliable or not, therefore reducing or solving ambiguity. 
What we have learned on how ambiguity enters into ICT-information uptake in irrigated 
agriculture is of strong policy relevance too. Accordingly, to be able to implement optimal strategies 
for ICT development and adoption, it is important to understand how DMs perceive new pieces of 
information (Visschers 2017). ICT developers should favor the involvement of end users and offer 
long trials or demonstrative events rather than a plug and play approach. Having hands on the 
platform, without necessarily implementing its information at DM’s own expenses, allows users to 
gain experience on ICT reliability. This would lower ambiguity and potentially foster the diffusion of 
ICT-information implementation. If applied studies will find that ambiguity affects decisions, policy 
should aim at ensuring DMs have access to ambiguity-reducing information on the technology’s 
performance (Ross et al. 2012). Further, better knowledge on the impacts that behavior has on ICT 
adoption would support uncertainty-management policies. If ambiguity is prevailing over risk, 
demonstrative initiatives and extension services addressed to show ICT reliability will better help 
DMs than ex-post risk management tools.  
The above described policies call for two kinds of model applications: one is related with the 
estimation of potential ICT-benefits; the other with the assessment of impacts of AA in the process 
of ICT implementation. If research will be developed in these ways, it will provide the evidences 
needed by policy makers for effective support to the sector. On the one hand, assessments of 
potential ICT-benefits would allow DMs being less doubtful on the economic performances of ICT 
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tools for irrigated agriculture. These would help investments for ICT development and adoption, 
overall facilitating the transition from precautionary decisions based on experience to ICT-
supported irrigation plans. Further, empirical assessments would allow to highlight restrictions for 
information usability which undermine ICT-benefits. This would support ICT-developers in targeting 
technologies to fit end users’ informational needs. On the other hand, because in this transition AA 
has the potential to undermine information implementation, the impacts of DM’s behavior must be 
assessed. Here, better insights on the behavioral perspective affecting ICT adoption would highlight 
the critical issues in the decision system to be targeted with ambiguity-management policies. On 
these two modelling developments will focus the following Chapter 3 and 4, where, respectively, 
we will develop a model to assess ICT benefits at the WA-level and a model to estimate the impacts 





3. The role of ICT in improving sequential decisions for water 
management in agriculture1 
3.1 Introduction and objectives 
For the management of water resources, WAs have to take decisions before knowing the 
weather conditions they are going to face. The high variability of weather patterns increases the 
level of uncertainty regarding future weather conditions causing a moving-target problem. In it, 
every year, due to CC, WAs are less and less able to take decisions consistent with the weather 
pattern of the following season due to the decreased predictability of events and to the less and 
less relevant use of past records to take future decisions. As a consequence, current water 
management decisions are often a compromise between the outcome determined by all the 
weather states that could emerge. Such compromise is balanced to the selection of less risky 
decisions instead of the decision that is best suited for the state that will emerge (Meza et al. 2008). 
As a consequence, WAs’ take sub-optimal decisions, with negative impacts on profits and water 
uses (Hallstrom 2004). In this respect the availability of ICTs might contribute on mitigating the 
moving target problem by providing timely information on future climate and weather conditions, 
thereby reducing uncertainty before and during the irrigating season (Fernandez et al. 2016). 
Overall, the ICT-informed decision process of water management could help irrigated agriculture by 
reducing losses from climate shocks and taking advantage of favorable years (Deichmann, Goyal and 
Mishra 2016; Guerra et al. 2017).  
These potentialities of ICTs for irrigation management together with the uncertainties on ICT 
benefits highlighted in 0 motivated our study. The objective is to address the issues of restrictions 
to information usability and quantitatively estimate economic benefits from the ICT-informed 
decision process of water management in agriculture at the WA-level. In this respect, a theoretical 
 
1 Published paper 
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model is designed based on insights from the BDT. It assesses the economic benefits brought by 
new pieces of information, influencing WA’s perception of uncertain events with direct 
consequences on its strategic decisions. Specifically, the model investigates the role played by 
information in supporting WAs to rationalize the management of water resources and the 
prevention of extreme weather events impacts. Because decisions on land and water allocation are 
sequential across the season and influenced one by the other, the methodology accounts for the 
passing of time in the decision process to assess how the time of information provision affects its 
usability. An empirical application is also provided to test the model by comparing current 
information tools with a new information technology developed in the MOSES H2020 European 
project. 
Developing and applying a method to assess the economic value of ICT seems to be an 
interesting topic for agricultural and resources economists (Tyrychtr et al. 2016). Moreover, 
considering the growing societal demand for climate services together with the limited budget 
availability (Vogel et al. 2017), this topic is of high policy relevance. The novelty of the present paper 
is twofold, both in the theoretical model and in its empirical application. To the best of author’ 
knowledge, the former stands out from the existing literature for considering the timing variable in 
sequential and inter-correlated decision steps. The empirical application of the model is also 
original: to the best of author' knowledge no economic research deals with ICT adoption by WA for 
the management of irrigation. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we review the recent 
literature on the assessment of ICT; in Section 3.3 we describe the case study; in Section 3.4 we 
define the methodology and the empirical implementation; in Section 3.5 we show our main results; 
in Section 3.6 we discuss the main findings and in Section 3.7 we draw final remarks. 
3.2 State of the art  
In agriculture, numerous ICTs have been developed and disseminated (Aker et al. 2016). 
Great potential is found for such technologies in contributing to food security and climate change 
adaptation in the agricultural sector (Vogel et al. 2017; Nakasone and Torero 2016). Qualitative 
studies showed their potential benefits for both developed and developing countries (Martin 2016). 
Among these, Deichmann, Goyal, and Mishra (Deichmann et al. 2016) identified the following: (i) 
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promoting economic performance, (ii) raising efficiency, and (iii) fostering innovation. Nevertheless, 
Aker et al. (Aker et al. 2016) suggested that ICTs impacts on decisions outcomes are highly variable. 
One reason of this variability lies in the findings of Nakasone and Torero (Nakasone and Torero 
2016); according to them, ICTs are successful only when key information needs are addressed. In 
addition, many ICT projects do not reach the expected success because developers take for granted 
information to be useful (Vogel et al. 2017). As a consequence, ICT developers tend to poorly consult 
end users on their information requirements and the resulting ICT may turn out to be inapplicable 
in their decision process. Quantitative analyses bring to similar conclusions. Accordingly, Macauley 
(Macauley 2006) finds that information services are useless if the WA do not need the information 
provided. To measure ICT benefits, Macauley treats information like other production factors, with 
both a value and a cost (Macauley 2006). According to him, Keisler et al. (Keisler et al. 2014)  defined 
the Value of Information (VOI) as an increase in the Expected Value (EV) of the decision outcome 
arising from the introduction of a new piece of information in the decision process. Quantitative 
analysis determined the VOI not only by accounting for the characteristics of the information 
provided, but also for the environment in which decisions take place (Meza et al. 2008). The 
elements characterizing information and determining its value are:  
a) content of information: the WA must be able to implement the additional information in the 
decision process; if the WA is not able to act upon information, it has no value for it; 
b) accuracy of information: the more accurate information is, the smaller will be the risk of 
failures and the higher the VOI; imprecise information is not capable of inducing any change 
in WA beliefs; 
c) timing of information provision: information must be provided at the right time in the 
decision process; late messages have no value. 
The timing factor (point c) plays a key role in influencing the accuracy of information (point 
b). Usually, information provided well in advance to the occurrence of an event might condition 
strategic decisions, but it will not be so accurate. If information is provided with a short advance, 
the decisions influenced by information will not be so strategic, but the information will be likely 
more accurate. This is typically the case of emerging information, as weather forecasts. Waiting to 
get more precise information about the occurrence of events has a cost (Smith and Ulu 2017). The 
cost of waiting is often identified with losses due to sub-optimal decision performances 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Riley 2013). Taking into account such timing element adds complexity 
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to models. Nevertheless, it leads to results more reliable than those coming out from analyses that 
ignore this important factor (Hardaker et al. 2015). 
Some parameters of the decision environment are capable of affecting the VOI too; among 
these, the following can be identified as the most important (Bikhchandani et al. 2013): 
a) uncertainty in the decision process: the higher climate variability is, the higher will be the 
benefits brought by information; 
b) the stake in the decision: the higher is the variance of decision outcome the more the WA 
will be willing to use information for reducing uncertainty. 
As a result, each element characterizing information or the decision environment have the 
potential to set the VOI to zero (Crean et al. 2015). For these reasons, the evaluation of investments 
in ICT must go beyond the traditional analysis of costs and revenues by accounting for the 
peculiarities of the VOI. To do so Bouma (Bouma et al. 2009) applied BDT to model the VOI from 
imperfect satellite-based technologies. According to them, Hardaker and Lien (Hardaker and Lien 
2010) in their literature analyses found BDT a suitable tool to model decision making under 
uncertainty. Finally, Galioto et al. (Galioto et al. 2017) measured the VOI deriving from sensors 
adopted in precise irrigation technologies through a model based on the framework of BDT.  
3.3 Case Study 
3.3.1 Description of the case study area 
The WA selected as case study is a reclamation and irrigation board named Consorzio di 
Bonifica della Romagna (CBR) and located in northern Italy. It covers 352,456 hectares out of which 
around 165,000 hectares are cultivated (1.2% of the Italian cultivated land). Although the basin 
includes plain, hilly and mountain areas the case study region is centered on irrigation districts 
situated in plain areas (Figure 2). Here the landscape is characterized by a dense irrigation network, 
where the majority of water delivery infrastructures is made by open-air canals. In the basin 4.8% 
and 1.4% of the Italian fruits and vegetables are respectively produced, generating an estimated 
revenue of around 700 million euros per year. The climate of the region is continental (summer 
maximum temperatures above 30 °C), mitigated by the sea influence in the North-Eastern part. 
Drought events are frequent in summer with a variable intensity. Although the total amount of 
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rainfall appears to be stable (750-850 mm), in the last few years it was recorded a change of the 
rainfall distribution. Specifically, it was noticed an increased frequency of heavy rainfall events 
alternated with longer periods of severe droughts characterizing a dry irrigating season.  
The case study region is selected because its decision process for water management is 
representative for other WAs located in Mediterranean countries where climate uncertainty 
strongly affects decisions for land and water allocation before and during the irrigating season. 
Further, the prevalence of open-air canals in the water delivery network enhances both the 
challenges and the potentialities of ICT adoption at the WA level. Accordingly, with canals technical 
barriers require the WA to anticipate decisions, making forecasts more needed compared to similar 
conditions with pressurized pipe networks. Finally, the CBR’s management board is considering 
adopting a new information service named MOSES and developed in the framework of the MOSES 
H2020 European project, recently introduced to fulfil WA’s requirements. 
 
  
Figure 2: Case study region 
 
The predominant water source for irrigation is the Canale Emiliano Romagnolo (CER). The 
CER is an open-air canal which diverts part of the water from the Po river to several irrigation boards. 
The irrigating season generally takes place from May to September. However due to yearly 
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variability it can be anticipated or delayed. Peaks in water delivery are in June and July, when crop 
water demand is higher. The operational unit at which decisions on water management are taken 
is the irrigation district. The basin of the CBR counts 81 irrigation districts located in a plain area. 
The average irrigated area is 68 hectares per district and the average length of the water delivery 
network is 6Km per district. To verify the usability MOSES services, the WA decided to narrow down 
the scope of investigation to a sub-group of its districts. Specifically, the WA selected only 32 of the 
81 districts covering an area of 18,845 hectares out of which 6,012 hectares are cultivated. Such 
districts have the common characteristics of a unique water source (represented by the CER) that is 
managed on demand, and of an irrigation network characterized by open-air canals. On average the 
irrigated land is around 2,878 hectares, 48% of the cultivated land (Figure 3). This area corresponds 
to the land that can be irrigated in conditions of average operational capacity of the water supply 
network. However, in regular seasons the network reaches its maximum operational capacity being 
able to satisfy the demand from irrigated crops for around 3,741hectares (130% of the average 
operational capacity). On the other hand, in dry seasons, the water supply network reaches its 
minimum operational capacity and the WA is able to satisfy the demand for irrigation for 2,014 
hectares (70% of the average operational capacity). Despite the fluctuations in rainfall patterns, the 
land use tends to be constant, where winter crops are prevailing (wheat, barley and meadow), 
followed by perennial crops (alfalfa, orchard, vineyard) and summer crops (maize and sorghum). 
The irrigation activity is centered around maize, orchard, vineyard and horticulture; winter crops 
are generally not irrigated, while other crops such as sugar beet and alfalfa are occasionally 




Figure 3: Land use in the case study region 
 
3.3.2 Management systems and information requirements 
Before the irrigating season, the WA decides about the amount and allocation of yearly 
concessions to cultivate annual irrigated crops. Concessions to irrigate permanent crops are granted 
for the whole lifespan of the plantation. The decision on the amount of yearly concessions to irrigate 
is taken at the time of seedling/transplanting annual irrigated crops, usually in April. Typically, the 
WA forbids concessions to latest applicants if the demand for concessions exceeds the average 
operational capacity of the supply network (6,012 hectares). Under conditions of uncertainty 
regarding the rainfall pattern of the upcoming season, this decision is the best compromise between 
releasing concessions to the maximum or to the minimum operational capacity of the supply 
network. During the irrigating season and in each sector of the agricultural region supplied, the WA 
has to plan with some advance (let’s say one week) whether to deliver water to a sector or not. This 
is typically the case of surface irrigation networks supplying water to an extended agricultural 
region. In such conditions, variations in the flow of water downstream the network occurs with 
some delay with respect to upstream variations in water flows. Thereby, under uncertain weather 
conditions, usually, WAs decide to supply water on the basis of fixed flow rates varying with the 
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season and consistently with the average climatic condition of the region and with the amount of 
concessions provided.  
Under this framework, the WA is considering the possibility of using MOSES service to 
improve its capacity to condition and to satisfy the demand for water to irrigate. Specifically, the 
WA is interested in knowing the average weather conditions for the upcoming season at the time 
of seedling/transplanting and short-term forecasts about irrigation requirements in each sector of 
the region served by the WA during the irrigating season. The first piece of information might 
influence the WA’s decision on providing concessions to cultivate irrigated crops, reducing the risk 
of making wrong choices. If a dry season is forecasted, the WA might decide to limit the number of 
concessions to the minimum operational capacity of the supply network. Otherwise, if a regular 
season is forecasted, the WA could set the limit of concessions to the maximum capacity of the 
network. The second piece of information would allow the WA to know whether to deliver water in 
each sector of the network enough in advance to take timely actions, adjusting water flows with the 
demand. Thus, this additional piece of information might influence the WA decisions on changing 
the management of the supply, improving the efficiency of the supply network. However, because 
of technical barriers the WA must guarantee a threshold of minimum flow in the main canal for each 
district to allow an even water distribution. This condition does not allow the WA to effectively 
manage water supply volumes and limits its capacity to save water when the demand for water is 
low. 
3.3.3 Usability of the MOSES information service 
MOSES provides spatial-detailed information to WAs both before and during the irrigating 
season. In the first case, information is a seasonal forecast of weather conditions and crop water 
requirements. In the second case, MOSES delivers every day a seven-day forecast of crop water 
requirements and weather forecast. To produce such information, MOSES combines, as input, crop 
maps determined with satellite images, crop transpiration models, climate data and weather 
forecast information. Specifically, with crop maps, crop water requirements are estimated and 
forecasted in each plot using crop models with input from climate data and weather forecasts.  
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As seen in the previous section, MOSES predictions before the irrigating season are likely to 
be used to manage yearly concessions to irrigate. In the current condition, the WA fixes concessions 
to irrigate to the average operational capacity of the supply network. With MOSES services, if a dry 
season is forecasted, the WA would limit the number of concessions to the minimum operational 
capacity. Otherwise, in view of a regular season it will release more concessions, up to the maximum 
operational capacity. Hence, the decision due is binary: to limit concessions to the maximum 
operational capacity or to the minimum operational capacity of the water supply network. The 
benefits generated are of avoided drought losses if the dry season occurs or of higher agricultural 
revenues in case of regular season. Nevertheless, information is not perfect, and two types of errors 
can emerge:  
1. the wrong prediction of a regular season: the WA receives a message specifying a regular 
season will emerge, but eventually the season will be dry; 
2. the wrong prediction of a dry season: the WA receives a message specifying a dry season will 
emerge, but eventually the season will be regular.  
The above errors lead to higher or lower concessions than the ones actually possible causing 
a sub-optimal use of land. If the number of concessions exceeds the contingent capacity of the WA, 
as a consequence of error 1, farmers would experience a loss given by the difference between the 
average income of rain-fed crops and irrigated crops with no irrigation water availability. It can be 
expected that rain-fed crops have a higher comparative performance in terms of income in case of 
low or no irrigation water availability. If the number of concessions is below the capacity of the WA 
as in the case of error 2, farmers would experience a loss that is given by the difference between 
the average income of irrigated crops with fully available water and rain-fed crops. 
MOSES forecasts during the irrigation season are likely to be used to support decisions on 
water allocation. Because of the fixed water flows and technical thresholds, water allocation 
decisions are binary: to deliver water to a district or not. Such decision is repeated daily during the 
irrigating season and for each irrigation district. Compared to the current condition where the WA 
delivers water to districts disregarding the demand, predictions of crop water requirements could 
support decisions on water allocation during the irrigating season. The potential benefits generated 
by this piece of information are: save water, lowering supply costs, allocate water efficiently and 
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softening damages in dry periods. Here again, the provided information is not perfect, and two type 
of errors can emerge: 
1. the wrong prediction that water requirements are above 0: the WA receives a message 
specifying that water is needed for irrigation in a specific sector of the network, but 
eventually water for irrigation is not needed; 
2. the wrong prediction that water requirements equal 0: the WA receives a message 
specifying no water demand for irrigation in a specific sector of the network, but eventually 
water for irrigation is needed.  
The above errors lead, respectively, to water flows or no water flows in sectors where 
respectively no water is needed, and water is needed. This causes a sub-optimal use of water, where 
the first error leads to water waste (measured by the amount of water actually distributed in the 
sector) with unnecessary supply costs. The second error leads to damage irrigated crops because of 
missing to deliver water when water for irrigation is actually needed (difference between the 
average income of irrigated crops with irrigation and irrigated crops with no irrigation).  
The whole decision process is represented in the decision tree of Figure 4. Decision 
alternatives branch form square nodes; the probabilities of uncertain events branch form round 
nodes and consequences of actions in states of the world are expressed in terminal nodes with 
prisms. In the two decision time steps (before and during the irrigating season) information is 
provided through a message. This might cause a revision of WA’s beliefs depending on the expected 
consequences associated to each message content and on the accuracy of the ICT. The decision 
process is made by two sequential binary decisions: to release concessions to the maximum 
operational capacity or to the minimum operational capacity of the water supply network and to 
deliver water to a district or not. The decision made in the second step is influenced by the expected 
consequences of that decision during the irrigating season and by the accuracy of the messages 
provided before the irrigating season. That implies a strict dominance of the accuracy of the 
messages provided in previous time steps on subsequent ones.  
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Figure 4: Decision process of MOSES adoption by the CBR (source: own elaboration) 
3.4 Methodology and empirical application 
3.4.1 Definition of the model 
The methodology adopts a simplified decision model to represent the decision-making 
process of the case study WA to select the best alternative among a set of actions upon receiving 
new information. The model assumes that a WA is managing water procurement and supply for a 
given agricultural region and that the WA must plan in advance some actions during two different 
inter-correlated decision time steps. The first decision step is supposed to be at the time of seedling 
transplanting, far in advance to the irrigating season, and involves the decision (action): release 
concessions to the minimum / maximum operational capacity of the supply network. Such decision 
is conditioned by the WA’s expectation about the occurrence of the states of the world (states, from 
now on): dry / regular season. The second decision step is supposed to be at the time of supplying 
water for irrigation and involves the decision: deliver / do not deliver water to irrigation districts. 
Such decision is conditioned by the WA’s expectation about the occurrence of the states: need / no 
need water for irrigation. In a chronological order the first decision influences the second. Thus, the 
usability of such information is then depending on the accuracy of the messages provided by the 
information service in both decision steps and on the stakes in the decisions, contributing in 
determining the expected consequences of using the information. In the following we provide an 
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analytical representation of the decision process both in case of un-informed decisions and ICT-
informed decisions. In the latter case, in each decision time step, a new piece of information is 
provided by a message. 
The decision model described above represents a decision process taking place in conditions 
of uncertainty. In the first place, we assume that the decision process involves a set of actions, X, 
and a set of states, S. The combination of the possible actions with the possible states determines 
the associated consequences, 𝑐7,1 measured in terms of economic payoff of the decision,	𝑣(𝑐7,1). 
The subscript 𝑥 denotes a specific action among the set of possible actions and the subscript s 
denotes a specific state among the set of possible states, where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑠	 ∈ 𝑆. For example, the 
consequence of not limiting yearly concessions for irrigable areas in a regular season is of drought 
losses and the associated payoff is the economic estimation of such losses. Thus, the actions taken 
by the WA have uncertain consequences determined by probability of occurrence of upcoming 
states, 𝜋1. In our case, the probability coincides with the climate-relative frequency of the event. 
Assuming the WA is acting rationally, it will base the choice of an action on the concept of EV 
maximization. EV of an action depends on the probability of the different states and on the payoff 
of the set of possible actions under the different states of the world (Bouma et al. 2009). With no 
information service, the maximization of the EV is obtained by the following equation (Eq. 2): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(7) 𝐸𝑉(𝑥, 𝜋1) =@𝜋1𝑣)𝑐7,1*1 	
Eq. 2 
In case of ICT adoption, the WA can receive a message, µ, among a set of messages, M (𝜇 ∈𝑀) The probability of receiving message µ	is identified as 𝜋D, which is measured as the frequency of 
that message relative to all messages delivered by the ICT. Messages provide information regarding 
the emerging states of the world. For example, a message can specify that a dry season will occur. 
Messages might modify the WA’s information environment altering the expectations associated to 
the upcoming states of the world. The extent to which the WA reviews his prior expectations follows 
the Bayes Theorem and is measured by the probability of state occurrence conditional to the 




⎪⎧𝜋D|1 ≡ 𝑗1D𝜋1𝜋1|D ≡ 𝑗1D𝜋D 																⇒ 											 𝜋1|D ≡ 𝜋1
𝜋D|1𝜋D 	
Eq. 3 
Where 𝜋D|1 is the probability of receiving message µ, conditional to the emergence of state 𝑠, and 𝑗1D is the joint probability of state s and message µ, also known as hit rate (Kusunose and 
Mahmood 2016). This is measured in a likelihood matrix by the frequency of correct messages on 
all messages delivered by the ICT. As can be noticed, the higher is the hit rate of the ICT, the higher 
will be the extent to which the WA will revise is prior expectations. This implies that, by means of 
the accuracy of the ICT, the WA revises its beliefs about states occurrence after receiving a message. 
This in turn will have an effect on expectations about decision outcomes with direct consequences 
on the choice of actions, allowing the WA to identify a new optimal action. The EV of this action 
after receiving a message is determined by the sum of payoffs weighted by the unconditional 
probability of the message and the respective conditional probability of the states. Considering an 
ICT delivering multiple messages, the maximization of the EV will be as follows (Eq. 4): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(7) 𝐸𝑉)𝑥, 𝜋1|D* = @𝜋DD @𝜋1|D𝑣(𝑐7,1)1  
Eq. 4 
Now, consider a simplified version of the model described above, with only two alternative 
states (𝑠Land 𝑠M), two alternative actions (𝑥L and 𝑥M) and one decision time step. This model can be 
represented through the diagram of Figure 5. In it, payoffs in each state are measured vertically and 
probability horizontally, ranging from zero to one in a bi-directional segment. Since states are 
alternative, meaning that one excludes the other, probabilities of state occurrence are 
complementary (𝜋L + 𝜋M = 1). Hence, a point along the segment represents both probabilities. In 
the diagram, the blue line joining 𝑣(𝑐1L7L) and 𝑣(𝑐1M7L) is the probability weighed average of 
payoffs for action 𝑥L. This line expresses the EV for that action as a function of probabilities. 
Similarly, the pink line, which joins 𝑣(𝑐1M7M) and 𝑣(𝑐1L7M) represents the EV of action 𝑥L for any 
probability distribution. For a given probability, the EV of the optimal action is displayed by the 
vertical distance from a point in the horizontal segment of probabilities to the higher EV function 
between 𝑥L and 𝑥M. Taking into examination an information service that can generate two 
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alternative messages (µL and µM), either message will lead to a vector of posterior probability, 𝜋|D =(𝜋1L|D, 𝜋1M|D). The line joining the EV of the optimal action if µL is received and if µM is received, 
defines the EV of the message service. This is mathematically represented by the probability 
weighted average of payoffs. So, following  Eq. 4, the VOI is graphically represented by the vertical 
distance from the line of the EV of the message service to the EV of the best un-informed action 
(green segment in Figure 5). 
  
Figure 5: Graphic representation of the decision model after receiving a new message  
Source: own elaboration from Bikhchandani et al. (Bikhchandani et al., 2013) 
Finally, we take in exam a decision problem involving T decision time steps. Decision steps 
are identified as sequential decisions occurring during time (before and during the irrigating season). 
For each decision step, t, there are independent actions, 𝑥P, messages, µP, and states, 𝑠P The set of 
possible consequences is obtained with the combination of actions and states in each time step, t, 
for the subsequent combination till the final decision step. In other words, the combination of 
actions, states and decision steps allows to identify the range of final outcomes of the decision 
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process. Since decision steps, states and messages are independent, the expected value 
maximization problem can be reformulated as it follows (Eq. 5): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(7QR) 𝐸𝑉)𝑥DP, 𝜋1P|DP* =S T@ 𝜋DPDP @ 𝜋1P|DP1P U 𝑣(𝑐7QR	,1P)P  
Eq. 5 
Hence, during time in the decision process, the final choice of actions made by the WA 
depends on the accuracy of the messages received until the final decision step. This way, a lack of 
accuracy in the first messages has a multiplier effect in determining the expected consequences of 
sub-sequential actions. Finally, in each decision step and for each message received the WA seeks 
the optimal choice of actions among the available. This is done through the identification of the 
optimal informed action (𝑥DP∗ ) achieving the highest EV given the states that can emerge and their 
relative posterior probabilities. The same happens in un-informed conditions, where, given the prior 
probabilities of states, the WA identifies the optimal un-informed action in each decision step (𝑥WP∗ ). 
After optimizing action choices, the VOI can be estimated as the difference between the EV from 
the sequence of optimal informed actions given the messages received and the EV of the optimal 
un-informed actions given the prior information environment (Eq. 6): 
𝑉𝑂𝐼 = 𝐸𝑉)𝑥DP∗ , 𝜋1P|DP* − 𝐸𝑉(𝑥WP∗ , 𝜋1P) 
Eq. 6 
As can be seen, the VOI of the ICT is positive only when the expected value of the best 
informed-decision is higher than the EV of the best un-informed decision. That is when posterior 
probabilities of the states given messages are higher than a threshold value that is at some point up 
to their prior. Otherwise messages would be uninformative, not conditioning any appreciable 
change in the behavior of the WA. 
3.4.2 Data collection and assessment procedure  
The usability of the information service is depending on the accuracy of the messages 
provided by the information service itself and on what is at stake in the decisions. These elements 
contribute in determining the expected consequences of using the information. The sources of 
information needed to carry out the economic analysis are mainly based on: (i) information 
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obtained by interviewing the WA; (ii) information provided by MOSES service; (iii) additional 
ancillary information. 
The first type of information is about the collection of primary data through an ad-hoc 
questionnaire. The questionnaire includes sections on: (i) WA information requirements; (ii) 
irrigation infrastructures (including details on water supply costs, efficiency of the supply system 
and on the amount of water delivered in each sector/district of the network); (iii) land use and 
cropping patterns (rain-fed and irrigated crop yields) and (iiii) damages caused by extreme weather 
conditions (probability of a drought, expected damages per crop categories). The questionnaire 
helped building the ICT informed decision model and to identify consequences of actions in states. 
Then with the joint use of secondary economic data on prices and yields from public databases (RICA 
– Rete di Informazione Contabile Agricola, 2017: http://rica.crea.gov.it/public/it/index.php) and 
information on land use, damages, crop prices and costs and on water price and use, it was 
estimated the economic payoff associated to consequences of actions in states. To simplify the 
assessment procedure, impacts of the decisions where estimated with the spatial limitation of the 
case study area. 
The second type of information is about the new pieces of information provided by MOSES 
before and during the 2017 irrigating season. These are mainly, crop water demand seasonal and 
in-season forecasts. Such data were provided with different spatial resolutions, then aggregated in 
functional management units (sectors of the irrigation network). The collection of such information 
allowed us to build a complete picture of the information environment which would have 
characterized the ICT-informed decision process of the WA in 2017. 
The third type of information collected was needed to assess the accuracy of MOSES services. 
These are observed data in the form of: (i) aerial photos (provided by the WA); (ii) weather 
observation (available from MOSES meteorologists) and (iii) observed crop water requirements. The 
collection of such information is justified by the fact that the accuracy of the service is mainly 
depending on three sources of uncertainty, contributing conditioning the accuracy of the messages 
provided by MOSES: (i) crop maps; (ii) water demand estimates; and, (iii) forecasts. The accuracy of 
information was estimated from the hit rate of the service, coming from the ratio between the 
number of correct messages on the overall messages received by the WA. This ratio is a rough 
estimate of the probability of correctly predicting current and upcoming states. Specifically: (i) by 
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comparing MOSES crop maps with aerial photos (provided by the WA) we calculated the probability 
that an irrigated crop mapped with MOSES satellite images match with an irrigated crop mapped 
with aerial photos; (ii) by comparing MOSES rainfall forecasts with rainfall observation we calculated 
the probability that a forecasted rainfall above the estimated crop water requirements match with 
observed rainfall above the estimated crop water requirements. In addition, due to missing 
information, we assumed that, by comparing MOSES estimates of irrigation requirements with 
measured irrigation requirements, the probability that a positive irrigation requirement estimates 
(greater than zero) match with a positive irrigation requirement measured with soil moisture 
sensors is close to 1. Each of the above comparisons and assumptions contributed to the calculation 
of the probability to predict a dry or a regular season before the irrigating season and the probability 
to predict water requirements above or below a threshold value of 10mm. This value is assumed to 
be the critical level influencing the amount of water to be supplied for each sector of the irrigation 
network during the irrigating season. 
3.5  Results 
The estimation of the accuracy of MOSES information was carried out by comparing MOSES 
output with observed data, as described in the previous section. Results about the accuracy of the 
messages provided through MOSES are displayed in the probability matrix of Table 2 and Table 3. 
The overall accuracy of each message is expressed by the probability to correctly detect the land 
use multiplied by the probability to correctly predict if water requirements are above the 10mm 
threshold. As can be seen from the tables, the accuracy of the messages is not evenly distributed 
between states and the crop classification appears to be less reliable than the forecast of water 
requirements. 
  MOSES crop classification 
  Irrigated Not irrigated 
Observed data on 
land use 
Irrigated 0,66 0,41 
Not irrigated 0,34 0,59 




  MOSES irrigation forecast 
  Water requirements 
above the threshold 
Water requirements 
below the threshold 
Observed data on 
water 
requirements 
Above the threshold 0,80 0,06 
Below the threshold 0,20 0,94 
Table 3: Probabilities to predict water requirements  
Water saving brought by the use of the forecast information are determined both in regular 
and dry season. Water saving variability is measured during time and it is calculated by comparing 
water requirement estimates with the water actually supplied to districts in 2017 (Figure 6). Water 
savings and water use tend to show a parallel trend. This highlights the fact that higher water savings 
are better achievable in periods with higher water use. In the first weeks of the irrigating season 
higher variability of water use can be found, with two peaks at week three and six. Such 
phenomenon is mainly due to the rain distribution in late spring which is particularly variable in the 
case study area. Further, at the beginning of the season peaks in water demand are caused by early 
concessions to irrigate. These are released to allow the seedling/transplanting of summer crops, 
extremely sensitive to droughts in the first phenological stages. Finally, in dry season, with water 
scarcity, lower water savings are achievable because water demand tends to be equal to the water 
available. 
Table 3 represents the payoff matrix expressing payoffs in each state action combination for 
both decision steps. In the assessment, the impact of optimal decisions is estimated to be zero, since 
they stand for the most suited management strategy given the emerged climate conditions. Then, 
with reference to the optimal decisions, losses are estimated for each sub-optimal state-action 
combination. Great variability in decision outcomes can be found because the same action has 
extreme consequences with the emerging of a dry season or a regular season. For example, with 
wrong water allocation decisions, great drought losses can emerge, or wrong land allocation causes 
sub-optimal use of resources with negative impacts on farmers’ income.  
By applying the model of Section 3.4.1, the accuracy of the ICT-information is used to 
compute the EV of each action whose payoffs are represented in Table 4. Then, the VOI is assessed 
as the difference in expected decision outcome between the best decision process with information 
and without information. Summing over the VOI assessed in each district, potential benefits of the 
ICT-informed decision model are estimated to be 156,426€ for the irrigating season of 2017 and for 
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all the 32 districts taken in examination (26.02 €/cultivated hectare/year). The spatial distribution 
of the VOI (Figure 7) is highly variable. Some districts have a null benefit from the implementation 
of such technologies, other very high.  
  
Figure 6: Estimated water savings during the irrigating season  
   States 
   s'1 s'2 
   s’’1 s’’2 s’’1 s’’2 
Actions 
x’1 
x’’1 - - 608,181 - 252,155 - 1,112,491 
x’’2 - 464,777 - - 366,491 - 252,155 
x’2 
x’’1 - 252,155 - 1,112,491 - - 860,336 
x’’2 - 366,491 - 252,155 - 728,569 - 
Table 4: Payoffs of the decision model in the case study region (€)  
Because the accuracy of information is estimated using inputs from only one irrigating 
season, it was considered useful to run a sensitivity analysis. This method is frequently adopted in 
literature for the estimation of ICTs (Hardaker et al. 2015). By varying the accuracy of information 
in both decision steps, we determined the VOI in each condition of the information environment. In 
other words, we built an index named Quality of Information (QI), ranging from 0 to 1 and expressing 
the probability to correctly predict events. It is determined by the average accuracy of the messages 
provided to the WA before and during the irrigating season. QI will equal 0 when the posterior 
probability to correctly predict events equals its prior. The opposite, in case of perfect information 
QI will equal 1. In the graph of Figure 8 it is shown how the VOI is related to the QI by rising the 
accuracy of information of every message in the two subsequent decision time steps. As expected, 
by raising QI for both decision steps, we see a non-decreasing linear trend of the VOI. It reaches its 
minimum in un-informed conditions (QI=0) and its maximum with perfect information (QI=1), where 
the WA is sure to make optimal decisions. The trend is linear because of the linear equation used to 
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model the VOI, which is determined as the difference in EV between informed and un-informed 
decisions. Kinks can be noticed in the trend of the VOI, these take place when a new piece of 
information is introduced with the required accuracy to cause a belief revision. Accordingly, for each 
decision there will be a threshold in the accuracy of the message provided, under which the WA 
does not revise its expectations about states occurrence. Above such threshold the WA revises its 
beliefs and perceives benefits of the improved decision. In the second decision step (T2) we 
determined the VOI both in case of perfect information at T1 (before the season) and no information 
provision at T1. This choice is motivated by the fact that the overall decision outcome is affected by 
the accuracy of information at both decision steps. In other words, water allocation decisions are 
influenced by the expected consequences of that decision during the irrigating season and by the 
decisions on land allocation made before the irrigating season. This implies that the accuracy of 
information provided in the first decision step has an effect on the minimum accuracy for 
information to be usable in the second decision step. 
  
Figure 7: Distribution of the VOI between irrigation districts 
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis for the VOI 
3.6 Discussion  
Results from the model show positive impacts form ICT adoption but with a high variability 
in its spatial and temporal distribution. The former variability is caused by different cropping 
patterns between districts. Specifically, in districts with high added value crops, the accuracy of 
information might be too low to cause a change in WA’s belief. Accordingly, stakes are higher with 
added value crops in respect to other crops. Thereby, losses caused by wrong information are 
relatively higher, diminishing the net benefit from following MOSES advices. The latter variability is 
caused by the fluctuation of water savings during time all along the irrigating season. Peaks are 
mainly due to the combined effect of rainfall patterns and crop water requirements. Considerable 
water savings can be achieved if a consistent rain or no water demand are correctly predicted. When 
crop water demand is lower than some specific technical threshold in water delivery, no water 
saving is attainable. 
The analyses of the case study showed that in some districts permanent crops are prevailing, 
here the VOI is low. This is due to the decision power of the WA which is not enough to influence 
land allocation of permanent crops in the medium term. Thereby, the WA cannot act upon the 
information received. This factor limits the efficiency of land allocation schemes informed by 
seasonal forecasts and enhances the spatial variability of the VOI. Moreover, due to the 
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characteristics of the supply network, the WA is not able to precisely allocate water according to 
needs. At this end, decisions are simply on whether to deliver water to a district or not. This, 
together with the limited decision power of the WA, limits the potential of MOSES services and 
highlights how local barriers might have a strong impact on benefits from ICT adoption. 
The complex nature of the decision-making process studied posed limits in the model 
capabilities to represent the decision problem. The WA selected as case study has a complex 
decision environment, with multiple sources of information, stakeholders, and complex decisions. 
This caused the first modelling limitation which is rooted in the simplification of the decision process 
of the WA. Further, the model overlooks transaction costs in information processing and 
implementation. The estimation of which was unfeasible due to lacking data and over-complexity 
of the model. Transaction costs can be expected to be relevant due to the often-lacking skilled 
human-resources needed for information processing. Their impact will cause ICT-benefits to get 
lower in the short term. 
The analyses showed a decision process that involves high risky prospects with decisions 
having extreme consequences at stake. As seen in the matrix of payoffs, decision outcomes are 
extremely variable and wrong decisions bring great losses. Because of this, the model finds its main 
limitation in neglecting the choice of risky actions by the WA. Accordingly, other behavioral aspects 
not reflected in the maximization of EV might drive WA’s decisions. By addressing the risk behavior 
in perceiving the quality of information, a more reliable estimation of ICT economic benefits would 
be achieved. In addition, deepening the knowledge regarding the relation between uncertainty and 
risk aversion seems a promising topic in the decision analytic literature (Keisler et al. 2014). Other 
than risk aversion, more emotional factors may influence ICT adoption, such as fascination with new 
technologies or aversion to adapt the decision making process to the same technologies (Plant 
2001). Nonetheless, we considered the impact of such emotional factors negligible in the 
medium/long term. In light of the risky elements in the decisions, the model should be developed 
to account for more long-term strategies in the decision process. Here, the information 
implementation choice might not only be driven by the contingent accuracy of information, but also 
by the perspective of service improvements. Finally, this work, as well as the recent literature on 
the topic (Aker et al. 2016), do not consider the potential external benefits of improving WA’s 
knowledge. For example, the WA could disseminate the received forecasts between farmers to help 
them in planning their activities.  
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A limitation of the exercise carried out in this paper is the data used. Data used as input in 
the model are just from the 2017 irrigating season. Given the variability of weather data, it would 
be preferable having a higher number of years observed. In addition, 2017 was a season particularly 
dry in compared to the climate average, which implies a likely overestimation of benefits. Even 
though results are not representative of the climate average or trends, they can show the VOI in a 
future climate scenario where drought events are expected to increase in frequency and length. 
Because the VOI is found to be dependent on agricultural revenues too, agricultural prices play a 
key role in determining ICT adoption. Furthermore, in future scenarios where high price volatility 
can be expected, this will reflect in an increase in the level of uncertainty in the decision 
environment. This will have a strong effect on the VOI, whose extent is not tackled by the present 
paper. The sensitivity analysis not only overcame the problem of estimating the accuracy of 
information with data from only the 2017 irrigating season. It showed the accuracy threshold levels 
over which decisions are influenced by a new piece of information. More importantly, it proved that 
despite the above limitations, the model is able to capture the VOI as a function of the accuracy of 
the messages provided. Finally, as decision problems are very much local-specific, also in relation 
with existing infrastructures and decision-making flexibility, the results cannot be generalized and 
would rather benefit of a wider testing exercise in areas with radically different decision-making 
conditions. 
Despite the limitations described above, the estimation of the VOI is comparable with and 
confirmed by results of other studies found in literature. In their review, Meza, Hansen, and Osgood 
(Meza et al. 2008) found the value of seasonal forecast for agricultural decision making ranging from 
0 to 700 $/ha. Such values are strongly affected by crop types. Lower bounds can be found in areas 
predominantly cultivated with cereals and extensive crops, with estimations that are in line with the 
findings of the present paper. Galioto et al. (Galioto et al. 2017) found higher VOI ranging from 
40€/ha to 200€/ha depending on water cost, crop price, farmer’s risk attitudes, quality of 
information and land quality. Particularly, their characterization of the VOI with the quality of 
information brings to similar conclusions to the sensitivity analysis carried out in this study. Results 
are confirmed by the work of Fernandez et al. (Fernandez et al. 2016) too. They estimate and 
characterize a VOI comparable to our findings. Crean et al.  (Crean et al. 2015) identify a comparable 
VOI too, ranging from 0.20 to 23.18 $/ha. Further they carry out a sensitivity analysis on the VOI by 
varying the accuracy of information, which results are of a non-decreasing trend of the VOI. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
The paper quantitatively estimated the potential economic benefits from the ICT-informed 
decision process of water management in agriculture at the WA’s level. To do so, a theoretical model 
was designed, simulating the decision process of a case study WA. The proposed methodology 
accounted for the combined effect given by: (i) the accuracy of information in a multiple decision 
step process and (ii) what is at stake in the decision process. This paper has shown that a 
combination of BDT and EV maximization can offer a suitable approach to deal with complex VOI 
modelling such as the ones of WAs. This approach seems promising as it links information with the 
time it is provided in a sequential decision process made by several decision steps. The 
implementation of such methodology showed that ICTs can provide useful climate information for 
improved decision support. Economic benefits are then recognizable, especially if considering 
adaptation strategies to extreme drought events related with CC. The magnitude of such benefits is 
conditioned by barriers due to local characteristics of the decision process: (i) site specific condition 
(land use and water delivery system); (ii) the decision power of the WA in affecting land allocation 
and, most of all, (iii) the quality of information required to take decisions. Notwithstanding the great 
potential of ICTs for WAs, these barriers strongly affect actual applications. Moreover, since many 
ICTs offer discrete technology components without providing any support to adapt the technology 
itself to each specific reality, this undermines their usability. VOI is strongly affected by the 
information environment and ICT should aim at delivering information tailored to WA’s specific 
needs (Furman et al. 2011). In other words, requirements in terms of accuracy of information; timing 
of information provision and restrictions in the application of the information have to be considered. 
This highlights the necessity to develop ICT jointly with end users. The simple provision of forecast 
information, even though high-quality, follows the “loading dock approach” (Cash, Borck and Patt 
2006). This is described as the production of relevant climate information which has no use in reality 
because its form or time provision is incompatible with actual decision making (Vogel et al. 2017). 
Hence, future ICT development in irrigated agriculture should aim at better answering to WAs’ 
specific needs of information. An approach based this way will foster WA’s adaptation capacity. 
Because public institutions have the potential to guide decision making processes through a better 
use of existing knowledge (Cash et al. 2006), policy intervention is advised. The suggestion is to 
implement policy tools to help private initiative facing high transaction costs in ICT implementation 
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jointly with end users. This is especially necessary in the case of ICT for WA, given their growing 
demand for detailed climate information (Vogel et al. 2017).  
 65 
Chapter 4 
4. Ambiguity, familiarity and information provision: 
implications for irrigation management 
4.1 Introduction and objectives 
Under the perspective of farmers and WAs, one of the major issues of CC is in the increased 
uncertainty brought about by unpredicted variability in weather patterns. In irrigated agriculture, 
this translates in two main sources of uncertainty: (i) uncertainty on the availability of water 
resources and (ii) uncertainty on water demand from crops. In general, the former uncertainty 
occurs before the irrigation season and affects land allocation, while the latter uncertainty occurs 
during the irrigation season and affects water allocation (Cavazza et al. 2018).   
Land allocation decisions are taken when seedling/transplanting irrigated crops and could be 
key to face dry seasons. In particular, if water scarcity was anticipated, arable land would be 
allocated to drought resistant crops, limiting climate losses. Nevertheless, in this time of the year it 
is too early to assess the availability of water resources. Accordingly, reservoirs are mostly filled up 
by rainfalls occurring between the land allocation decision and the start of the irrigating season. 
Then, during the irrigating season the available water in the reservoir is known. At the same time, 
CWD is uncertain due to the unpredicted variability in upcoming temperatures and lack of tools to 
determine transpiration. This limits the decisions on how to allocate water both in case of scarcity 
and with resource availability. In case of water scarcity, not knowing Crop Water Demand (CWD) 
does not allow to set priorities in the use of the available resources to minimize losses. In regular 
years, not knowing CWD can cause excess uses which can induce scarcity, other than unnecessary 
environmental and energy costs. Because of such uncertainty settings, farmers and WAs are forced 
to implement precautionary irrigation plans which are inefficient, but their outcome is not subjected 
to risks with average climate conditions. However, the increased frequency of extreme events 
located at the tails of the climate distributions is posing new challenges for irrigation management. 
Here, inefficiency can further increase susceptibility to CC even in those years when reservoirs are 
full, because un-expected and prolonged droughts might determine scarcity afterward.  
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The present chapter focuses on these issues in water allocation. Here there is a strong need 
for new irrigation governance paradigms where resource-efficient irrigation plans must be 
implemented by all actors managing irrigation to save water and to favor adaptation in the sector. 
At this end, climate-information is key to lower uncertainty and to support efficient decisions. ICT 
can be powerful tools to this purpose and numerous platforms have been developed to aid decisions 
at the farm and at the WA- level (Cavazza et al. 2018). These ICT are capable of providing information 
on CWD, overall allowing reductions in the use of water, granting at the same time to achieve 
optimal production levels. 
However, the simple information provision is not sufficient to achieve the expected benefits 
from ICT-development initiatives (Vogel et al. 2017). If DMs receive an ICT but do not implement it, 
putting ICT-information into action, there are no economic benefits from ICT development. This is 
true even with high quality information (Cash et al. 2006) and is testified by numerous examples in 
literature that show behavioral barriers in ICT implementation (O’Mahony et al. 2016). This is often 
caused by a lack of knowledge on information reliability: if on the one hand technologies providing 
relevant information are extremely useful in lowering climate uncertainty, on the other hand they 
raise uncertainty on their reliability. The latter uncertainty can be identified as ambiguity over 
information reliability. Ambiguity is common with the adoption of a new technology and rises from 
a lack of knowledge on its performance (Barham et al. 2014; Ward and Singh 2015). In the case of 
ICT, DMs frequently perceive a certain degree of ambiguity because they have never experienced 
information reliability. Thus, to foster ICT uptake, it is not sufficient to understand if the new 
technology can be reliably used to support strategic decisions. Because ambiguity can limit 
information implementation, we also need to understand if DMs have enough knowledge on  ICT 
reliability. This rarely occurs with new ICTs, on which DMs are likely to have no direct or indirect 
experience. Anyhow, they might be able to try the ICT and test information, without necessarely 
implementing it. If so, with the passing of time, DMs would gain experience with the technology and 
might solve their ambiguous perceptions in the, so called, process of familiarity. This  favors 
technology adoption (Gars and Ward 2019), but it can take a fairly amount of time (Barham et al. 
2015) which might cause inefficiencies and further discourage information implementation.  
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The problem is exacerbated in the management of common pool resources, where efficiency 
is conditioned by the choices of all actors involved in the exploitation of the resource itself. Here, 
when actors are not coordinated, virtuous choices of some can be undermined by others who might 
not implement information received (Alpizar, Carlsson and Naranjo 2011). This is the case of 
irrigation districts, where decisions on water use are taken at the farm- and at the WA-level: farmers 
have to decide the amount of water to deliver to crops, the WA, in turn, has to decide the amount 
of water to deliver to farmers. Here, a new ICT could help at both levels, but its benefits will be 
appreciable only if information is reliable and all actors implement it. Namely, when the WA puts 
information into actions to save water, but farmers in the irrigation network do not, there will be 
losses or inefficient allocation even if the ICT proves to be reliable. Between farmers, when 
information is not implemented by some who excess-use the resource, the others might experience 
water un-availability. Because each actor (farmers and WA) have different attitudes toward 
ambiguity on ICT reliability, this problem will frequently affect ICT implementation.  
These settings prompted us to assess the impacts that subjective behavior under ambiguity 
has in undermining ICT potentials for efficient water management in irrigation districts. To do so, 
we developed a behavioral model representing the decision between inefficient but riskless 
irrigation plans or ICT-aided efficient irrigation plans with uncertain outcomes. At this end, 
ambiguity perception plays a key role, but it evolves with familiarity. Therefore, we addressed the 
issue of learning on ICT reliability and developed a new learning rule representing the update of 
ambiguous beliefs. Finally, we consider an empirical example of a simplified irrigation district 
located in Northern Italy. Here, we implemented the model to quantitatively estimate how Water 
Use (WU) and Water Productivity (WP) vary after the introduction of a new ICT. These indicators 
are used to estimate ICT-impacts on the district’s efficiency and its evolving in time. The empirical 
implementation helped to highlight issues in the governance system which lower the district’s 
efficiency in the time lag between the first time DMs receive the ICT until when they are familiar 
with it. Findings will support irrigation districts in the implementation of efficient ICT-aided 
management plans as well as uncertainty-management policies in fostering ICT diffusion. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next section (Section 4.2) we will 
briefly consider the literature of uncertainty on technology’s reliability and its dynamics as DMs gain 
experience on it. Then, we will describe the theoretical model developed (Section 4.3); in Section 
4.4, we implement the model to highlight the impacts that ambiguity has on WU and WP. In Section 
 68 
4.5, we provide an empirical example of a simplified irrigation district to highlight the relative 
governance issues.  In Section 4.6 we present results. Finally, in Section 4.7 and 4.8 we discuss the 
main findings and draw conclusions and policy implications. 
4.2 State of the art  
In this section we will analyze the most relevant literature which is considered helpful in 
understanding the uncertainty settings around decisions for ICT-information implementation. In the 
following subsection we will frame uncertainty affecting the adoption of a new technology, 
underlining the role of lack of knowledge on its reliability. Then, we will analyze how perceptions on 
ICT reliability might evolve in time as the DM gains new insights and how this learning behavior is 
modelled. 
4.2.1 Ambiguity and new technologies adoption 
The literature on technology adoption in agriculture is widely tackled and sees the major 
contribution from one of the most cited paper of Caswell and Zilberman (Caswell and Zilberman 
1985). These authors carried out a literature review on determinants of technology adoption and 
found that risk and uncertainty had frequently a significant role. Specifically, they highlighted the 
importance of a subjective risk caused by farmers being unfamiliar with the new technology. 
However, they do not deepen the issue and, given the time, do not consider those technologies 
providing information such as ICT.  
To assess the potential impact that a lack of knowledge on technology reliability has on the 
adoption of the same new technology, the framework of ambiguity can be a powerful tool (Engle-
Warnick and Laszlo 2017). The role of ambiguity in agricultural decision problems was firstly 
addressed by Engle Warnick, Escobal and Laszlo (Engle Warnick, Escobal and Laszlo 2008), who 
highlighted that both RA and AA affect farmers’ choice between the technological status quo and a 
new technology. Specifically, they consider that AA might limit the adoption of new crop varieties 
because their performance is unknown. Later, Ross et al. (Ross et al. 2012) confirmed these findings 
and underlined that more than RA, it is AA to reduce the probability of technology adoption. Further, 
they expressed the need to have policies ensuring farmers having access to information on the 
technology’s performance to lower their perceptions of ambiguity. Contrarily to these findings, 
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Barham et al. (Barham et al. 2014) showed a case where AA increases the likelihood of farmers to 
implement new technologies. However, in their analyses they considered a technology which helps 
reducing crops exposure to pests whose occurrence is ambiguous. Similarly, Alpizar et al. (Alpizar et 
al. 2011) found AA favoring the adoption of technologies against extreme CC-related events. Here 
again, the technology protects DMs against events whose occurrence is ambiguous because of the 
un-measurability of CC (Alpizar et al. 2011). Finally, Ward and Singh (Ward and Singh 2015) 
considered a new technology which does not alter ambiguity distributions. As expected, they found 
that AA did not favor the technological status quo nor the adoption of the new technology. 
Even if the above studies take into consideration different technologies and none address 
the issue of ICT-information implementation, their findings are extremely useful to our context. 
Specifically, by comparing results, it is evident that the impact of AA in determining technology 
adoption is specific to the effect the technology has on un-measurable uncertainty. If a new 
technology is expected to lower variance in the distribution of ambiguous events, its adoption will 
be favored by AA as found by Alpizar et al. (Alpizar et al. 2011) and Barham et al. (Barham et al. 
2014). Otherwise, if it will raise ambiguity due to lack of knowledge on its reliability, ambiguity-
averse individuals will be reluctant in implementation. The latter case is found by Engle-Warnick et 
al. (Engle Warnick et al. 2008) and Ross et al. (Ross et al. 2012) and is expected to be more frequent 
because the technological status quo is known to the DM, as opposed to a new technology whose 
performance is uncertain (Alpizar et al. 2011). 
If we take into consideration those type of technologies providing information, such as ICT, 
no paper is found by the authors to be addressing the role of AA. However, Nocetti (Nocetti 2018) 
and Snow et al. (Snow 2010) analyze the relation between AA and the value of new pieces of 
information. Again, the relation depends on the type of information considered. Risk-reducing 
information is positively valued by risk-averse DMs, while ambiguity-reducing information is 
positively valued by ambiguity-averse DMs (Snow 2010). If we apply this concept to the case of an 
ICT delivering climate information, we ascertain that it will lower the share of climate uncertainty 
which is risk. Here the new piece of information will narrow variability in the risk distribution of 
climate events. Therefore, the ICT will deliver risk-reducing information and will be positively valued 
by risk-averse DMs. These will find higher expected utility from ICT-informed decisions than in the 
un-informed settings. However, if we consider that the same ICT is a new technology, another share 
of uncertainty will rise in the form of ambiguity which is due to a lack of knowledge on ICT reliability. 
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This issue will cost an ambiguity-averse individual to lower his expected utility from the same ICT-
informed decision. Nocetti (Nocetti 2018) further deepened this phenomenon and highlighted that 
it is the share of ambiguity remaining after information is received that mostly affects its value. This 
does not depend on the message itself, but it is due to a lack of knowledge on the reliability of the 
message-service (Nocetti 2018). Overall, risk-reducing information provided by an ambiguous ICT 
will have a positive value for a risk- and ambiguity-averse DM only in case of a positive tradeoff 
between risk reduction and ambiguity rise. 
As a result, ICT implementation will only occur when risk reduction is prevailing over 
ambiguity rise and the DM puts into actions the ICT-information received. This occurs only in some 
situations, but the tradeoff evolves in time as ambiguity lowers thanks to the process of familiarity 
described in the following section. 
4.2.2 Familiarity and learning patterns in technology adoption 
In the previous subsection we highlighted how, when approaching a new ICT, DMs have 
personal beliefs on the technology’s reliability expressing ambiguity over information received. 
Ambiguity is then updated as the DM gains experience helping him to assess whether information 
can be trusted or not (Epstein and Schneider 2007). This phenomenon is described as familiarity 
which takes place as a learning process where the DM updates ambiguous beliefs on the basis of 
new insights.  
In literature, the topic of DM’s learning behavior in technology adoption is deeply analyzed. 
Here, learning is defined as “the evolution of assessed subjective probabilities, as new information 
becomes available over time” (Barham et al. 2015) and allows DMs becoming familiar with the new 
technology. One of the first to analyze learning under ambiguity was Marinacci (Marinacci 2002) 
which modelled how ambiguity disappears as the number of draws from an Ellsberg’s urn coincides 
with the number of balls in the urn. Later, Epstein and Schneider (Epstein and Schneider 2007) 
considered more complex settings and proposed a learning rule which is one of the most relevant 
to model decisions under ambiguity (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). He modelled ambiguity as 
variability in a set of risk distributions over future states of the world. This set is then updated during 
the learning process and variability shrinks as the DM becomes familiar with the new environment 
(Epstein and Schneider 2007). Because he found Bayesian update to be too extreme under 
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ambiguous settings, he developed a model to account for more intuitive choices. Despite being 
reliable, the model proposed by Epstein and Schneider (Epstein and Schneider 2007) is referred to 
data-generating problems where the only repetition of draws allows to solve ambiguity (Etner et al. 
2012). However, such kinds of problems are not directly applicable to the learning behavior 
occurring with new technologies. Accordingly, while betting in an urn, the number of alternatives 
building risk can be objectively measured and objectively updated with the repetition of draws, with 
new technologies this is not always possible. This is mainly due to the fact that new insights on the 
technology’s performance are often available in the form of noisy parameters (Engle-Warnick and 
Laszlo 2017) which are subjected to the DM’s own perceptions. 
Barham et al. (Barham et al. 2015) tested three learning rules applied to new technology 
adoption in agriculture: (i) Bayesian learning; (ii) First-1 and (iii) Last-1. In all alternatives, prior 
ambiguity perceptions are assumed to be un-informative. Bayesian learning is identified when a 
rational DM observes the performance of the technology over time and weights each observation 
equally. While in the First-1 and Last-1 learning rules the DM considers respectively only the first or 
the last observation. Between these three, the only Bayesian rule is the least representative and 
farmers tend to follow a mixt of this rule with First-1 or Last-1 rules (Barham et al. 2015). These 
results highlight the need to develop and test new learning rules for technology adoption. These 
should include elements of rationality from the Bayesian update, but allow at the same time some 
degree of intuitive choice as suggested by Epstein and Schneider (Epstein and Schneider 2007). 
Moreover, when considering the specific case of a new technology providing weather-related 
information, as the one analyzed in the paper, there are further obstacles in the application of 
existing models. While the performance of other technologies can be generally measured in terms 
of production, with weather-related ICT, the DM is not able to quantitatively assess the extent to 
which information received was reliable. Many climate parameters are hard to measure and 
quantitative comparisons between forecasts and observations are frequently impossible at the end-
user level. This underlines the need to model an updating behavior having the qualitative approach 
with which the DM might judge ex-post the performance of the ICT and update his beliefs. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Overview of the theoretical model 
In the previous section, we have showed that the introduction of ICT in decision problems 
raises ambiguity due to a lack of knowledge on information reliability. This is generated by a DM 
being unfamiliar with the ICT and will limit him to implement information if he behaves as 
ambiguity-averse. The behavioral model developed in this section aims at representing the decision 
between implementing a riskless and inefficient Precautionary Plan (PP) and an efficient ICT-
informed Risky Plan (RP) for irrigation. Further, we consider how such decision evolves with time, in 
the period between the first time the DM approaches the new ICT until when he is familiar with it. 
To do so, the model accounts separately for the effects that risk and ambiguity have on the adoption 
of a new ICT for water management. While the share of risk involved in the implementation decision 
is considered constant, ambiguity is updated in the process of familiarity. Because no learning rule 
for the update of ambiguous perceptions is found to be fitting to the context, we developed a new 
one. This allows to model how the decision evolves as the DM gains experience on information 
reliability. 
In the following Section 4.3.2, we will define the decision environment. Here, two farmers 
and a WA are the actors managing water allocation in an irrigation district. In the business as usual 
settings, uncertainty forces all actors to manage irrigation by implementing an inefficient but 
riskless PP. Then, in Section 4.3.3, we consider how irrigation management can gain efficiency 
thanks to information provision by the ICT. Here, both ambiguity and risk occur, because, 
respectively, the ICT is a new technology and provides probabilistic information. The impacts of AA 
and RA on the information implementation decision is analyzed in Section 4.3.4. Finally, in Section 
4.3.5, we assess how things change with time as the DM gains familiarity. Although the model 
assumes simplified settings, it is capable of describing how uncertainty affects the ICT-information 
implementation decision and, in turn, water demand (in Section 4.4). Finally, the model will be 
applied to the case study to assess how ICT-informed water demand translates into WU and WP to 
estimate the districts’ efficiency (in Section 4.5).  
 73 
4.3.2 Context: three actor districts 
Suppose there is a WA managing water allocation for an irrigation district with two farms: 
farm 1 and farm 2. The two farms are comparable in size and cultivated crops; both have to make 
decisions on the right amount of water to irrigate. The main difference is in their location: farm 1 is 
upstream the irrigation network and farm 2 is downstream. This way, farm 1 is the first to access 
the resource and farm 2 gets the remaining water. No external regulation exists to avoid excess-use 
of water by farm 1. As a consequence, farm 2 is less favored and farm 1 owns a position rent at the 
expenses of farm 2. This condition is a frequent issue with common resources where differences in 
accessibility can cause uneven distribution of benefits (Cremer and Laffont 2003). 
The model considers ordinary settings when reservoirs are full but excess-use cause 
environmental issues, unnecessary costs and might increase susceptibility to droughts occurring 
later in the season. Here, the WA has to decide how much water to pump in the irrigation network 
but does not know farmers’ water demand. To avoid water un-availability at the farm level 
(especially at farm 2), the WA implements a PP for water management. In this plan, the irrigation 
network is filled up to its operational capacity, with flows being higher than the sum of what each 
farm can irrigate at the maximum. So, possible excess-use of the resource by farm 1 would not affect 
water availability in farm 2. Nonetheless, the plan comes at a cost being the water used overly high, 
up to a level defined by 𝑋[\. 
A similar decision is made by farmers, because: (i) they are unsure about CWD and, (ii) if they 
do not satisfy CWD, there will be production losses. To avoid letting part of their income being 
exposed to uncertainty, they implement a PP and irrigate at the field capacity, at a level that 
guarantees no water stresses (𝑋]^_`a). Both PPs are riskless (at the cost of excessive water used) 
and their payoff function (𝑔(∙)) is state independent, coinciding with the following value (Eq. 7; Eq. 
8Error! Reference source not found.): 
𝑔(𝑋[\) = 𝑉(𝑋[\) − 𝑐[\𝑋[\ 
Eq. 7 𝑔(𝑋]^_`a) = 𝑉)𝑋]^_`a* − 𝑐]^_`a	𝑋]^_`a  
Eq. 8 
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Where 𝑉)𝑋]^_`a*  represents the optimal revenues achieved when water demand is fully 
satisfied. Because the WA is not producing crops but its aim is to maximize farms’ profits at the cost 
of water used, we represent its revenues as follows (Eq. 9):  
𝑉(𝑋[\) = 𝑉)𝑋]^_`d* + 𝑉)𝑋]^_`e* 
Eq. 9 
In Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 we have two positive coefficients, 𝑐]^_`a  and 𝑐[\; these represent the 
volumetric cost of water under the actor’s perspective. Here, 𝑐]^_`a  is the volumetric cost needed 
to irrigate the field such as energy costs, resource costs and labor; it includes only those costs which 
are proportional to the quantity of water used. This simplification is driven by the fact that costs for 
machineries and in-farm delivery systems are fixed in the short term and cannot be reduced by 
efficient ICT-aided irrigation plans. Therefore, we assume that they will not be taken into account 
by the farmer during the implementation decision. On the other hand, 𝑐[\ represents the 
volumetric cost of water under the WA perspective. It includes costs for energy, water and external 
costs attributed by the WA to the resource (opportunity costs and environmental costs). Although 
costs which are disproportionate to the quantity of water used prevail in WAs’ budget, they cannot 
be affected by efficient ICT-aided decisions. For this reason, we will focus just on the volumetric 
costs of water, overlooking infrastructure maintenance and other costs which are assumed to be 
fixed in the short term. 
4.3.3 Information provision 
Now, suppose a new ICT provides information: (i) to farmers, on the average water demand 
from crops cultivated in their field (𝑥]^_`afgh ) and (ii) to the WA, on the average water demand from 
crops cultivated in whole district (𝑥fgh[\ = 𝑥]^_`dfgh + 𝑥fgh]^_`e). Thanks to the new piece of 
information, farmers can now irrigate so as to distribute the exact amount of water needed by crops 
and the WA can pump into the network the water volumes really needed by farmers.  
Although being resource-efficient (𝑥]^_`afgh < 𝑋]^_`a), this plan is risky if compared to 
irrigating at the maximum level. This is due to the fact that the ICT is not capable of providing perfect 
information; therefore, errors in water requirement estimations are possible. Several states of 
water demand can occur, where water requirements from crops could potentially differ from the 
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one estimated by the ICT. Each state (𝑥]^_`a1 ) identifies a specific event within the state-space 
defined by 𝑆 and identifying the set of feasible states of water demand from crops (𝑥]^_`a1 =𝑥]^_`a1L , 𝑥]^_`a1M , … 𝑥]^_`a1k ; 𝑥]^_`a1 𝜖	𝑆). 
To help DMs facing this issue, attached to the estimation of water demand (𝑥]^_`afgh ), the ICT 
delivers the Probability Density Function (PDF) of revenues in states (𝜋(𝑥]^_`a1 )). With the message, 
the DM knows the water volume needed by crops and the PDF of revenues achievable if he irrigates 
as specified in the message. The probabilistic nature of such kind of ICT-message helps DMs to 
account for uncertainty in states variability and to plan their actions consistently with it (Arnal et al. 
2016). In this paper we assume that the PDF of states is normally distributed, where the average or 
expected payoff coincides with the optimal revenue achieved in the PP (𝑉)𝑋]^_`a*), minus the costs 
of water used (Eq. 10).  
𝔼𝝅(𝒙𝒔)(𝑓)𝑥]^_`a1 q𝑥]^_`afgh *) = 𝑉)𝑋]^_`a* − 𝑐𝑥]^_`afgh  
Eq. 10 
This equation highlights how information allows to implement an irrigation plan in which the 
farmer can produce the same quantity of output as with the PP, with less water. However, the payoff 
of this output is subjected to the uncertainty estimated in 𝜋(𝑥]^_`a1 ). Therefore, we label this 
irrigation plan as RP and its uncertainty elements will be treated in depth in the next section. 
An example of the PDF received by the DM is provided in Figure 9: PDF of states of water 
requirements. Since the two farms are different, each will receive a different distribution with a 
different average. The two distributions will have the same standard deviation because errors are 
unrelated with the value estimated and depend only on the technology generating information. 
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Figure 9: PDF of states of water requirements 
4.3.4 Risk and ambiguity 
In the previous subsection we highlighted how information provision by the ICT allows to 
save water. This comes with a cost of putting at risk the decision payoff. If the DM is risk-averse, he 
will find lower Expected Utility (EU) from the RP than a risk neutral DM. To understand the DM’s 
choice, it will be necessary to estimate his EU for the uncertain payoff 𝑓)𝑥]^_`a1 q𝑥]^_`afgh *. If we 
consider only the probability estimation (𝜋(𝑥1)) provided by the ICT, EU for the RP (𝐸𝑈_) is defined 
with the following formulation (Eq. 11Error! Reference source not found.) developed on the basis 
of Savage’s postulates (Savage 1954): 
𝐸𝑈_)𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)* = 𝑢 s𝔼𝝅(𝒙𝒔)𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)t = ' 𝑢)𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)*𝜋(𝑥1)𝑑𝑥1𝑺  
Eq. 11 
where 𝑢(∙) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and 𝔼0(7v) is the expectation 
operator for the risky environment. Because the expected payoff coincides with the optimal 
revenue at the costs of water used (Eq. 10), Eq. 11 simplifies as follows (Eq. 12): 
𝐸𝑈_)𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)* = ' 𝑢(𝑉(𝑋) − 𝑐xxyz)𝜋(𝑥1)𝑑𝑥1𝑺  
Eq. 12 
Despite the ICT providing a full probabilistic picture of risk, another share of uncertainty is 
un-measurable and generates ambiguity. This is due to the fact that the ICT is new to DMs and they 
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do not know if the probabilistic estimations received are reliable. Apart from the PDF specified by 
the ICT, other probability functions are feasible. We now identify with 𝜋fgh(𝑥1) the PDF provided 
by the ICT to distinguish it from all other feasible I Order PDFs. As a result we have a set, ∆, describing 
the set of feasible first order probability estimations (𝜋|(𝑠) = 𝜋L(𝑠); 𝜋M(𝑠); 𝜋fgh(𝑥1); … ; 𝜋(𝑠)). To 
describe variability in ∆, DMs have personal beliefs identifying a distribution of first order 
probabilities (µ(𝜋(𝑥1))). This is a II Order PDF assigning a weight to each I Order distribution in ∆. 
The II Order PDF is assumed to be normally distributed and its average coincides with the probability 
estimation provided by the ICT (𝜋(𝑥1)} = 𝜋fgh(𝑥1)) (Figure 10). In practice, by assuming such a II 
Order PDF, we consider that the DM builds his ambiguous perceptions in the form of a normal 
probabilistic distribution and believes that 𝜋fgh(𝑥1) is the most likely to be correct. 
 
Figure 10: PDF of first order probabilities 
If DMs are ambiguity-averse they perceive disutility from this variability in first order 
probabilities. Therefore, to reliably assess their EU it is necessary to account for ambiguity and 
ambiguity aversion too. The formulation adopted in this paper follows the smooth model of 
ambiguity sensitive preferences developed by Klibanoff et al. (Klibanoff et al. 2005) (Eq. 13):  
𝐸𝑈_,^)𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)* = 𝔼∆𝜙 s𝑢)𝔼𝑺𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)*t= ' 𝜙 ' 𝑢(𝑉(𝑋) − 𝑐𝑥fgh)𝜋(𝑥1)𝑑𝑥1𝑺  µ)𝜋(𝑥1)*𝑑𝜋(𝑥1) 
Eq. 13 
Similar to Eq. 12, 𝜙(∙) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern second order utility function 
expressing preferences over first order probabilities. The model has a double expectational form 
which allows the separation between ambiguity, which is a belief of the DM, and ambiguity aversion 
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which expresses his attitudes. Thanks to this feature, beliefs and attitudes are then treated 
separately, where to the first class belongs risk perception and ambiguity perception, while 
attitudes are RA and AA.  
To aid the understanding of the problem, it is often useful to consider the Certain Equivalent 
(CE) of an uncertain payoff rather than its EU. This is defined for a DM as the “…sum of money ’for 
sure’ that would make that person indifferent between facing the risk or accepting the sure sum.” 
(Hardaker et al. 2015). It is obtained by the inverse utility function of the EU of an uncertain payoff. 
Its practicality will be helpful to compare the sure payoff of the PP with the uncertain payoff of the 
RP. To assess the CE of the RP, we considered negative exponential utility functions for payoffs and 
probabilities (Eq. 14, Eq. 15): 
𝑢	(∙) = −𝑒_(∙) 
Eq. 14 𝜙	(∙) = −𝑒^(∙) 
Eq. 15 
where 𝑟 and 𝑎 are respectively the risk aversion coefficient and the ambiguity aversion 
coefficient, both are positive and range from 0 to 1 with higher aversion. The KMM model of Error! R
eference source not found. is used to assess the CE of the risky plan, which simplifies as follows, 
given the assumptions of normality in both first and II Order PDFs (Eq. 16): 
𝐶𝐸(𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)) = 𝔼∆ 𝔼-(𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)) − 12 𝑟𝜎0(7v)M  − 12𝑎𝜎D(0(7v))M  
Eq. 16 
The proof is given in Appendix 1: Simplification for the CE computationError! Reference s
ource not found.. 
4.3.5 Update of ambiguous beliefs 
While ambiguity-attitudes can be assumed as constant in time (Hanany et al. 2009), the 
perception of ambiguity decreases as the DM gains experience on ICT reliability. This phenomenon 
frequently results in a slow and progressive implementation of new technologies to support 
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decision making. In Section 4.2 we found no learning pattern to be capable of fully representing the 
update of ambiguous beliefs on ICT’s reliability. Therefore, we propose a new learning rule 
developed to account for the peculiarities of the context 
Until now we considered a single decision event, but decisions for water allocation are 
repeated periodically along the irrigating season and in every season. We identify with Time Frame 
(TF: 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇) every period beginning with the choice of the irrigation plan and ending when the 
decision pays off. In the first TF (𝑡 = 1), when receiving for the first time ICT-information, DMs have 
no experience on its reliability. However, they build their own beliefs expressed in the form of a 
normal distribution of averages of I Order PDFs. The resulting distribution (II Order PDF: µ s𝜋)𝑥1̂*t), 
is updated with time as the DM gains new insights on the ICT reliability, helping him to refine his 
beliefs.  
To describe the updating process, we assume that, at the end of each TF, states are 
manifested and DMs can assess if ICT-information has proven to be correct. This phenomenon 
allows DMs to learn on the ICT reliability as they become more familiar with it.  The learning process 
is modelled with the DM getting a binary signal from the environment (ℎP = ℎ; ℎ), describing 
whether information has been correct (ℎ) or not (ℎ). Both the sum of the positive signals (∑ ℎP ) 
and the sum negative signals (∑ ℎP ) are weighted by a positive coefficient, named updating rate 
(𝑤). This is included between 0 and 1 and reflects DM’s subjective inclination to revise his prior 
beliefs in light of new evidences; the higher the coefficient the faster the learning will be. The 
updating model is described by the following step function (Eq. 17): 
µ(𝜋(x1)|t) =
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧µ)𝜋(x1)*L∑ L∑ µ)𝜋(x1)* 	𝑖𝑓	@ℎ > @ℎ1	𝑖𝑓	@ℎ ≤ @ℎ
 
Eq. 17 
The first time the DM is approaching the new ICT (tW), the only element helping him to build 
his ambiguity distribution will be his prior belief (µ)𝜋(𝑥1)*). Then, from the second TF on, ambiguity 
will be described by a posterior PDF, where the prior is updated on the basis of the signals received, 
as described in the equation above. Even after the third TF, the prior distribution to be updated 
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remains the one built by the DM the first time he approached the ICT (tW). For example, at t5 if the 
DM has received 5 positive signals, the updated ambiguity distribution will be: D)0(v)*d D)0(v)* . This 
behavior is similar to the First-1 learning rule described by Barham et al. (Barham et al. 2015). 
However, while with the First-1 rule the prior remains constant in time and is never updated, here 
it is constant in time, but it is updated every TF. This is also different from the Bayesian update, in 
which the posterior in a TF becomes the prior in the TF following. The developed rule highlights that, 
in every TF, the DM’s choice takes always into account also the prior beliefs he had at t0. 
Because the updating process consists of scaling the prior PDF, all posteriors remain normally 
distributed. The only exception occurs if  ∑ ℎ ≤ ∑ ℎ , where the prior transforms into a uniform 
distribution. If so, we reach the highest level of ambiguity, where variance is equal to infinite and all 
the I Order distributions are feasible and equally probable. In such settings, ambiguity is at its 
maximum and will likely cause the DM to not implement information received. Instead, if  ∑ ℎ >∑ ℎ , as new positive signals are received and they outnumber negative signals, variability in µ(𝜋(𝑥1)|𝑡) lowers, while means remain unchanged. This mean-preserving contraction is 
represented in Figure 11 and is made possible by the shift in the updating process. To explain this 
phenomenon, as the DM receives new positive signals, we can consider that the probability of I 
Order distributions which are in the tails exponentially lowers. Therefore, the set of feasible 
distributions in first order probabilities shrinks (∆L> ∆M> ∆h) as the DM observes that some 
distributions are unfeasible. This process of familiarity favors information implementation because 
it raises EU for an ambiguity-averse DM. The process continues as the ratio between positive and 
negative signals rises, up until the point when the only distribution remaining in the set is the one 
provided by the ICT. At this point, ambiguity is solved, and the DM recognizes that 𝜋fgh(𝑥1) always 
estimates uncertainty correctly. 
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Figure 11: Mean-preserving contraction in second-order probabilities 
As a result of the familiarity process, EU from the RP evolves, because perceptions are 
altered; the updated CE is computed as follows (Eq. 18): 
𝐶𝐸(𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)|𝑡) = 𝔼∆𝒕 𝔼-(𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)) − 12 𝑟𝜎0(7v)M  − 12𝑎𝜎D(0(v)|P)M  
Eq. 18 
If we consider an ICT capable of estimating all errors in the I Order PDF, meaning that 𝜋fgh(𝑥1) is always the correct distribution, a DM familiar with the ICT (𝑡 → ∞) will have the 
following CE (Eq. 19): 
limP→§𝐶𝐸(𝑓(𝑥1|𝑥fgh)) = 𝔼-(𝑓(𝑥1|xxyz)) − 12 𝑟𝜎0(7v)M  
Eq. 19 
This simplification is made possible because variance in II Order PDF is null and it results in a 
CE which is equal to the one of an ambiguity neutral DM (𝑎 = 0). Otherwise, if ambiguity remains 
because of errors in probability estimations, it will still affect expectations as shown in Eq. 18.   
4.4 Identification of water demand 
In the previous section we modelled how ambiguity affects expected utility from ICT-
informed decisions and how this phenomenon evolves at the end of a TF, when the DM gains new 
insights on ICT reliability. Still, in each of these TF, it is to be defined the impact that ambiguity has 
on WU. Specifically, we saw each actor having to choose between a PP which is riskless but 
inefficient and an ICT-informed efficient RP, subjected to risk and ambiguity. Here, the DM will 
 82 
switch from the PP to the RP only when expected utility of the first plan is lower than expected 
utility of the second. Only in such condition the DM will implement the ICT and put information into 
action to save water, otherwise information provision will be useless. However, it is to be underlined 
that the decision variable is the volume of water used, which is a continuous quantity. Therefore, 
we will further develop the model to help identifying not only the switching point between the PP 
and the RP, but also the optimal water volume to be used under the DM’s behavioral perspective. 
This will build the actor’s water demand and will be key to understand issues in governance which 
undermine ICT potential benefits. 
4.4.1 The cost-loss model in presence of ambiguity 
To help understanding when the DM will switch from the PP to the RP, we will develop the 
widely adopted cost-loss model proposed by Thompson and Brier (Thompson and Brier 1955). The 
model helps to define when to take a PP and face a sure cost (𝐶) instead of implementing a RP and 
risk a loss (𝐿) with a probability (𝑝) defined by a forecast. The model ignores ambiguity and assumes 
risk-neutral behavior. It suggests to DMs to take protective actions when the expected value of the 
RP is lower than the PP (g« > 𝑝). As shown in the representation of Figure 12, the issue complicates 
in presence of ambiguity: even if  g« > 𝑝 it is not clear which action to take if the ratio falls within the 
II Order PDF (Allen and Eckel 2012) 
 
Figure 12: Cost-Loss model in presence of ambiguity  
Source: own elaboration from Allen and Eckel (Allen and Eckel, 2012) 
To answer to this issue, we follow the same principle of the cost-loss model and extend it to 
the DM’s behavior. We consider that the DM will move from the PP to the RP when the CE of the 
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RP will be greater than the CE of the PP. In our example, this translates into the CE of the RP being 
greater than the sure payoff of the PP, given that the latter plan is riskless (Eq. 20): 
𝑔(𝑋]^_`a) ≤ 𝐶𝐸(𝑓)𝑥1|𝑥]^_`afgh *) 
Eq. 20 
When the two elements in Eq. 20 are equivalent, we reach an equilibrium where the DM is 
indifferent between being exposed to uncertainty and take the RP or avoid risk and ambiguity and 
implement the PP. Other things equal, information will only be implemented when ambiguity is as 
low as to let the DM being indifferent between being exposed to uncertainty in the RP or receive a 
sure payoff from the PP. This is likely to occur only when the DM has gained enough familiarity with 
the ICT to lower his doubts on its reliability. 
4.4.2 Management of the input variable: from a discrete choice to a continuous 
decision 
The model described until now represents a situation in which the DM is faced with a discrete 
choice among two different management plans. However, the DM has to decide the continuous 
quantity of water to use (𝑋]^_`a; 	𝑋[\) in order to maximize his EU. Even if not applying the volume 
specified by the ICT, DMs could implement information and decide to rise 𝑥]^_`afgh  or 𝑥[\fgh  to get rid 
of part of uncertainty, if not all. Therefore, we consider the DM will rise the water volume specified 
by the ICT until it will grant to reach the equilibrium in Eq. 20. The result of this problem will define 
the optimal water quantity, building water demand for farmers (𝑥]^_`a¬ ; Eq. 21) or the WA (𝑥]^_`a¬ ; 
Eq. 22): 
𝑥]^_`a¬ = 𝑥]^_`afgh + 12 𝑟𝜎0(v)M + 12𝑎𝜎D(0(v)|P)M𝑐]^_`a  
Eq. 21 
𝑥[\¬ = 𝑥[\fgh + 12 𝑟𝜎0(v)M + 12𝑎𝜎D(0(v)|P)M𝑐[\  
Eq. 22 
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where the proof can be found in Appendix 2: Simplification for the computation of the 
optimal water volume.  
If considering neutrality to uncertainty, the equation is simplified and the optimal water 
quantity is the one specified by the ICT (𝑥]^_`a¬ = 𝑥]^_`afgh ). Accordingly, the element de_­®(¯v)e de^­Q)®(¯v)|R*e°±²³´a  can be interpreted as the cost of water, additional to the requirements, that 
is employed by the DM to get rid of part of uncertainty. Or 𝑥]^_`afgh  is the optimal water volume for 
an uncertainty neutral DM. As evident, an uncertainty-averse DM will rise the water volume 
specified by the ICT to account for his dis-utility coming from being exposed to risk and ambiguity. 
This will heavily impact on water allocation efficiency, as described in the following chapter. 
4.5 Empirical Example 
In the previous section we identified the water volume each actor wishes to use under his 
behavioral perspective. In this section we provide a numerical application of the model described 
until now. This example is aimed at highlighting issues in irrigation governance which contribute to 
undermine ICT benefits due to differential behavior among actors in the district. Accordingly, 
because perceptions and attitudes are subjective, there will be differences in the extent to which 
actors will implement information to save water. As a result, virtuous choices of some who decide 
to implement ICT-information to use less water can be undermined by others who do not (yet) rely 
on the same piece of information. For example, if farmers rely on information received and try to 
save water, but the WA does not, there will be water waste because of excessive volumes pumped 
in the network. Even worse, it can happen that the WA pumps in the network lower water volumes 
than with the PP, but farmers might not rely on the ICT and wish to implement the PP. This results 
in no water availability and drought losses in those farms located at the bottom of the irrigation 
network. These two are the main issues which can cause strong inefficiencies after the introduction 
of a new ICT for irrigation management. To analyze and estimate their impact singularly, we will 
carry out two scenario analyses, each corresponding to one of the issues highlighted above.  
In this empirical application and in both scenarios, we consider a situation in which all actors 
in the irrigation district are given a new ICT. Then, they can decide whether to implement 
information received and put into action efficient and risky irrigation plans or not. Anyhow, they 
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observe ICT-performance and, after each TF, they gain experience on information reliability. To 
simplify the model implementation, we analyze the specific situation in which all uncertainty around 
the ICT-message is included in the PDF received by each DM. This means that 𝜋fgh(𝑥1) is always 
capable of correctly estimating the likelihood of states. Therefore, when all DMs will be familiar with 
the technology, they will solve their ambiguity and act consistently. However, the process of 
familiarity can be long, this will cause very heterogeneous timing in information implementation. In 
this time lag, there will be inefficient water management.  
In the following subsections we provide a general overview of the case study, describing the 
context in which we fit the model and how we collected data. Then, we will take into consideration 
each scenario singularly and highlight its implications and issues for water governance. Finally, we 
will analyze the role familiarity plays in this context and highlight how, apart from governance 
regulations, it is the only element capable of granting efficient ICT-informed water management. 
4.5.1 Data collection 
The data used for the empirical application described in this section is collected with the help 
of the Consorzio di Bonifica di Secondo Grado per il Canale Emiliano Romagnolo and of the 
Operational Group “Reti di Consegna Intelligenti - Automazione della rete di consegna delle acque 
irrigue mediante calcolo dei fabbisogni delle aziende agricole aderenti a IrriNet” financed by the 
Rural Development Programme 2014-2020 of the Emilia-Romagna Region (Italy). This Operational 
Group is aimed at assessing the viability of new ICT-based irrigation allocation models which require 
the automatization of hydraulic nodes in the irrigation network.  The area considered for the case 
study is represented by the reclamation and irrigation board of Consorzio di Bonifica di Piacenza 
which is located in the Po valley, province of Piacenza, northern Italy. Here, several irrigation 
districts can be identified, each having independent water sources managed by a single WA. The 
district selected to implement the model is the one named Basso Piacentino. It covers a flat area of 
around 3,000 hectares and was selected for its representativeness of the irrigation context. The 
main crops cultivated in the district are corn, tomato for industrial processing, alfalfa and forage. All 
crops are irrigated, but corn and tomato are the most water demanding crops. The irrigating season 
starts from March-April and ends in September-October. The only water source in the district is the 
Po river, which is the major water source for irrigation in the whole Po Valley. To favor irrigation 
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management, the district is divided in two separate sub-districts: Basso Piacentino Monte and Basso 
Piacentino Valle (Figure 13: Overview of the two sub-districts.  
 
Figure 13: Overview of the two sub-districts 
The two sub-districts are comparable in size and cultivated crops as shown in Figure 14: Land 
use. They include different farms, however, for the purpose of this paper, we consider each sub-
district to be managed by a single DM, as if it was a single farm. Because Basso Piacentino Valle is 
located at the top of the irrigating network, it corresponds to Farm 1 in our model; Basso Piacentino 
Monte instead corresponds to Farm 2. Accordingly, the only water source in the district is an inlet 
from the Po River which is located at the border of Basso Piacentino Valle and is managed by the 
WA. Through the inlet, water is pumped from the river to the irrigation network which distributes 
water first in Basso Piacentino Valle, then in Basso Piacentino Monte. The WA can manage water 
volumes to be pumped from the river to the district but has no tool to manage water use within 
Basso Piacentino Valle, therefore Basso Piacentino Monte gets the remaining water. 
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Figure 14: Land use 
4.5.2 Assessment procedure 
To gather inputs for the assessment of WU and WP, we implemented a web-based platform, 
named IRRINET. This is an Italian ICT which provides farmers and WAs daily information on irrigation 
requirements (Munaretto and Battilani 2014). To run its agrometeorological models, IRRINET needs 
inputs on soil; precipitation; crop productivity and irrigation systems. This information was made 
available by the WA and helped to assess the daily evapotranspiration and CWD for each of the 
major crops cultivated in the district. Then, with the use of a modified version of the equation 
presented in the FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper N°33 (Doorenbos and Kassam 1979) (detailed 
description is reported in Appendix 3: Relation between irrigation and crop production), we 
estimated crop productivity as function of the share of CWD satisfied by irrigation.  
The WA provided also the volumetric cost of irrigation at the farm level (𝑐]^_`a) and outputs 
prices. With regards to the volumetric cost of water at the WA-level (𝑐[\), this should include 
resource and external costs, as assumed in the model. Such costs are difficult to be estimated and 
the only available information was relative to the bill the WA has to pay to the provider per each 
volume of water pumped from the reservoir. Therefore, we made hypothesis considering 𝑐[\ as a 
function of the costs at the farm level. Specifically, we hypothesized 𝑐[\ being 50% higher than the 
weighted average volumetric cost of irrigation in the two sub-districts. To assume external costs of 
water being proportional to the in-farm water cost is a significant simplification. Opportunity costs 
might be somehow related to the in-farm water costs, but environmental costs are likely to be not. 
Following the purpose of this paper, we want to highlight how, if the WA considered higher water 
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costs other than the private ones, this would affect water management. At this end, precise 
estimations of the total cost of water would be helpful, but at the same time, these would not 
change the decision dynamics which are the focus of this research. In addition, we will run a 
separate simulation to highlight the differences in decision dynamics between a situation where the 
cost of water is made only by the water bill and a situation with the assumed total cost of water.  
Thanks to the use of economic data, together with crop productivity, we were able to assess 
net revenues as function of water used (𝑉(𝑋]^_`a)). Finally, to estimate the dynamics of the 
district’s performance in the time lag when actors’ actions are not coordinated in information 
implementation, we analyze the evolving of WP (Eq. 23Error! Reference source not found.): 
𝑊𝑃 = 𝑉(𝑋·¸) + 𝑉(𝑋·¹) − 𝑐[\𝑋[\𝑋[\  
Eq. 23 
This is an indicator expressing the farm revenues per volume of water pumped in the network 
by the WA. Its use allowed to analyze the evolving of the district’s performance from the time when 
the ICT is firstly introduced until when all actors are familiar with it. 
In the district, choices for the irrigation plan are not made on a daily basis due to technical 
restrictions in water delivery and in-farm irrigation systems. To account for this issue and to simplify 
the analyses, results are considered on a two-months basis. The two-months periods in which the 
irrigating season is divided are: March-April; May-June; July-August; September-October. All the 
results derive from data of the 2018 irrigation season. 
Because IRRINET provides deterministic information, to account for the probabilistic nature 
of the ICT-messages hypothesized in this paper, we applied Monte Carlo Simulation. This technique 
is used to generate normal distributions having as input the average and standard deviation of the 
samples. For each period and for each sub-district, we run one simulation with 500 iterations, using 
the software Palisade @Risk. Averages and standard deviations for the simulations are determined 
from the range of variability in revenues derived from the input data provided by the WA. The 
resulting distribution represents the variability in payoffs from the ICT-aided irrigation decisions in 
the period considered.   
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As an example of the simulated I Order distributions, Figure 15: I Order PDF of revenues in  
denotes the share of risk affecting seasonal revenues in the period March-April. This uncertainty is 
estimated by the ICT in the form of a normal PDF and describes how seasonal revenues in the whole 
district are distributed if irrigation follows the advice of the ICT in the period considered. Results are 
determined in absolute terms and on a per-hectare basis. In the district, the seasonal average 
revenue (7,769,648€ - 2,563€/ha) is constant between periods, while standard deviations vary, 
depending on the impacts that irrigation in one period has on the revenues of the whole season. In 
other words, the expected seasonal revenue is one, but its variability is conditioned by the time of 
the season the decision is taken. This is evident from Table 5 reporting standard deviations in the 
simulated PDFs of revenues at the district level. Here, in the periods May-June and July-August, 
variability is higher because of the key role irrigation has in these periods when crops are most 
sensitive to droughts. Accordingly, missing irrigation requirements in May-June and July-August has 
higher impacts than in other periods where the share of crop production subjected to uncertainty 
is lower.  
 
Figure 15: I Order PDF of revenues in the district for the period March-April 
 
Table 5: Parameters of the I Order PDF representing risk in the district for one period  
Since we did not have information on actors’ perceptions either, Monte Carlo Simulation was 
used to simulate the II Order PDFs too (Figure 16). Here, averages correspond to the expected value 
in the relative I Order PDF, as assumed by Klibanoff et al. (Klibanoff et al. 2005). Standard deviations 
Average Standard deviation















March-April 7,769,648 2,563 652,969 215
May-June 7,769,648 2,563 1,058,601 349
July-August 7,769,648 2,563 1,053,017 347
September-October 7,769,648 2,563 561,071 185
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were determined assuming that the range of feasible distributions (∆) varies within 30% of the I 
Order PDF. This assumption implies that errors in probability estimations are up to the 30%; such 
error is considered equal between actors. From Table 6 we can see that standard deviations are 
significantly higher than the correspondent I Order distribution due to the assumptions made on 
the range of feasible distributions. With regards to differences in ambiguity between periods, these 
reflect the differences in the I Order distributions: with higher variability in the I Order PDF we will 
have higher variability in the II Order PDF too. The simulated II Order PDFs, obtained for each actor 
and for each period, are then updated following the learning rule expressed in Eq. 17. This allowed 
mean-preserving contractions in the distributions, resulting with a lowering in standard deviation 
with time (Figure 17). Given the specific case considered, where the ICT is capable to correctly 
estimate all uncertainty in 𝜋fgh(𝑥1), standard deviation lowers after each TF, until ambiguity is 
solved.  
 
Figure 16: II Order PDF of revenues in the district for the period March-April  
 
Table 6: Parameters of the II Order PDF representing ambiguity in the district 
Average Standard deviation
















March-April 7,769,648 2,563 1,108,993 366
May-June 7,769,648 2,563 1,224,099 404 
July-August 7,769,648 2,563 1,119,908 369
September-October 7,769,648 2,563 965,435 318 
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Figure 17: Standard Deviation of the II Order PDF 
Finally, we applied Eq. 21 and Eq. 22 which gave as output the numerical estimations of the 
actor’s demand for water in absolute terms and on a per-hectare basis. Because the developed 
model determines WD as function of variability in the II Order PDF, as standard deviation lowers 
also WD lowers in the learning process. To better understand model’s output, we assessed the 
extent to which the simulated behavior differs from a situation in which the actor always 
implements the PP or the RP. As a result, in  Figure 18 and Figure 19 we have WD of one actor which 
always implements the PP (WD_Precautionary); the simulated WD (WD_Simulated) and WD of an 
actor which is neutral to uncertainty and always implements the RP (WD_Neutrality). From both 
figures, it is evident how, with the learning process, the lowering in variance allows to lower the 
simulated water demand thanks to the progressive information implementation. The simulated 
behavior sees the actor implementing the PP in the first TFs, then as ambiguity lowers, he starts to 
implement information and reduce the water volumes he would use. Eventually, when ambiguity is 
solved the simulated WD gets comparable to the uncertainty-neutral actor’s one. However, as can 
be seen in the graphs, WD_Simulated never coincides with WD_Neutrality. Although WD_Simulated 
gets constant when the actor is familiar with the ICT, it is always higher than WD_Neutrality. This is 
due to the elements of risk aversion in the simulated behavior which are absent in the uncertainty-
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neutral behavior. Therefore, when an actor is familiar with the ICT, the difference between 
WD_Simulated and WD_Neutrality represents a form of risk premium. This is expressed in m3 of 
water the actor is willing to use in excess to get rid of part of the risk involved in the RP.  Figure 18 
is reported as an example to highlight how WD from one actor varies across periods; this is due to 
the different water requirements from crops across periods. Instead, in one period there are 
differences in WD between Basso Piacentino Monte and Basso Piacentino Valle (Figure 19) because 
of differential land use.  
 
 Figure 18: Comparison between periods of the evolving of WD in Basso Piacentino Monte 
 
Figure 19:Comparison between actors of the evolving of WD in March-April 
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4.6 Governance issues and scenario analyses 
By applying the above described assessment procedure, we were able to identify the water 
volume each actor wishes to use under his behavioral perspective. Now, to understand how this 
affects WU and WP at the district level, we have to take into account the relations between actors 
along the irrigation network. Accordingly, even in conditions of regular water availability, the 
volume an actor would use to irrigate might differ from the one at his disposal. This migh be due to 
the fact that, in the management of common resources, the decision of an actor is capable of 
affecting resource availability of another. This is the case of the irrigation management process 
described in the following paragraph. 
The irrigation management process along the irrigating network can be represented as 
follows. The WA decides the water volume to be pumped in the network according to its demand 
(𝑥[\¬ ). In sub-district Basso Piacentino Valle, WU will correspond to 𝑥¬·¹  if 𝑥¬·¹ ≥ 𝑥[\¬ , otherwise, 
the DM irrigates up to 𝑥[\¬ . In the first case, after water has been used to irrigate in Basso Piacentino 
Valle, to Basso Piacentino Monte remains the available water. In the second case, it remains no 
water to Basso Piacentino Monte. In any case, if the remaining water in Basso Piacentino Monte is 
higher than CWD, there will be no impact from poor governance, otherwise water un-availability 
will cause revenues to be lower than expectations. Finally, if WU in Basso Piacentino Monte will be 
lower than water availability (𝑥¬·¸ + 𝑥¬·¹ ≤ 𝑥[\¬ ), part of the water pumped in the network 
reaches the end section of the district where it is discharged. 
As made evident by the process above described, water demand is the key variable to 
highlight governance issues. However, it depends on the actor’s subjective behavior, on which we 
did not have any information. To overcome this lack of data, we made hypothesis on behavioral 
coefficients and varied them in the following two scenarios, which are the most representative in 
determining the dynamics of WP:  
1. Scenario 1: the WA starts to implement information earlier than farmers; 
2. Scenario 2: farmers start to implement information earlier than the WA. 
In both, we consider an actor to start implementing information when the water volume he 
decides to apply (𝑥]^_`a¬  or 𝑥[\¬ ) is lower than the precautionary one. These two scenarios are 
selected because they highlight the main two problems which can rise from poor coordination. 
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Accordingly, despite the infinite number of combinations between actors’ behavior, their impacts 
on the district’s efficiency can be divided in the two alternatives described later in this subsection. 
The actors’ behavioral coefficients in the two scenarios differ only for the coefficients of ambiguity 
aversion (𝑎), where in Scenario 1 𝑎[\ < 𝑎·¸ and 𝑎·¹ = 𝑎·¸; the opposite,  in Scenario 2 𝑎[\ >𝑎·¸ and 𝑎·¹ = 𝑎·¸ (Table 7 and Table 8). 
In the first scenario, we suppose that the WA is the first actor to implement information 
received because of its lower ambiguity aversion (Table 7). As a result, the WA pumps in the network 
a water volume which is not sufficient for both farms if they implement the PP and irrigate at the 
field capacity. Because farmers’ actions are not coordinated, it is likely that in Basso Piacentino Valle 
there will be excess use of water. This will cause the available water in Basso Piacentino Monte to 
be lower than CWD, so revenues will get lower than expectation with economic losses. If we analyze 
the occurrence of such losses with the passing of TFs (Figure 20), we see that in the first place no 
loss occur; because, notwithstanding excess-use in Basso Piacentino Valle, the remaining water in 
Basso Piacentino Monte is sufficient. Then, as the WA reduces the pumped volumes, losses occur; 
these are higher in the core of the irrigating season when crops are more susceptible to droughts. 
After actors have gained familiarity, no losses in Basso Piacentino Monte are manifested. 
  Behavioral coefficients 












2.0E-07 6.0E-04 2.0E-01 
Table 7: Actors' behavioral coefficients in Scenario 1 
 95 
 
Figure 20: Losses in Basso Piacentino Monte due to over-use in Basso Piacentino Valle in scenario 1 
The above explained inefficiency in water governance do not allow to maximize farms’ 
revenues with the available water; this has strong impacts on WP. Accordingly, if we analyze the 
evolving of the district’s WP during time (Figure 21), we see that, in the first TFs after the 
introduction of the ICT, WP is extremely low due to excess-use of water and production losses in 
Basso Piacentino Monte. However, in WP there is a positive trend and, as ambiguity is solved in the 
process of familiarity, WP reaches relatively high values. Has done with WD, to better understand 
model’s output we also determined WP in a situation where all actors implement the PP 
(WP_Precautionary) and where all actors are neutral to uncertainty and always implement the RP 
(WP_Neutrality). Here again, the trend of WP reflects a progressive information implementation 
and, with it, a progressive achievement of ICT-benefits. In the first TFs, WP is low and coincides with 
the business as usual situation when all actors implement the PP and the district’s efficiency is low. 
Then, WP rises as WU lowers and losses in Basso Piacentino Monte are less important; finally, WP 
reaches values comparable with the settings when all actors implement the RP. Again, 
WP_Simulated never coincides with WP_Neutrality, due to the remaining risk and the risk-aversion 
in the simulated behavior. 
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In Scenario 2 we hypothesize that DMs in the two sub-districts are the first to implement 
information because of their lower aversion to ambiguity (Table 8). Here, farms’ efforts to save 
water are wasted at the district level because the WA pumps water in excess. Then, water will be 
wasted downstream the irrigating network, not being fully used by farmers. This translates into low 
WP up until the time when also the WA starts to implement information and progressively lowers 
water volumes pumped in the network. Accordingly, in the graph of Figure 21, we see WP in the 
first TFs being extremely low, then, as the WA progressively reduces water volumes, WP rises with 
a non-decreasing trend 
  Behavioral coefficients 












2.0E-07 6.0E-05 2.0E-01 
Table 8:  Actors' behavioral coefficients in Scenario 2 
 
Figure 21: WP during time 
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In parallel with the assessment of the dynamics in WP, we estimated how, with the passing 
of TFs, water savings at the district level evolve (Figure 22). These are determined considering the 
simulated use of water in the district, having as benchmark WU with the PP. Reflecting the trend in 
WP, in the beginning no savings are achievable at the district level because actors decide to 
implement the PP. Then, the process of familiarity allows to lower water demand ( Figure 18) and, 
with it, WU in the district.  
Both in the assessment of WP and water savings, between the two scenarios values are 
comparable. However, we can see that in Scenario 1 higher levels in the district performance are 
reached few TFs earlier than with Scenario 2. This interesting pattern reflects the dominant role of 
the WA driving water use efficiency in in the whole district. Decision at the WA level are key because 
they not only condition water availability at the farm level, but also determine water use for the 
district. Accordingly, if farmers implement information but the WA does not (Scenario 2), there will 
still be water waste at the end section of the irrigation network. 
 
Figure 22: Water savings with the passing of TFs  
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A specific consideration must be made in the estimated values of WP. Here, the main 
highlights are: (i) in the periods March-April and September-October WP is much higher than in the 
rest of the season and (ii) in the first TFs of the periods May-June and July-August WP has negative 
values. The first highlight reflects the fact that CWD in the core of the irrigating season is much 
higher than in the shoulder season, given the same production levels. Negative WP values uncover 
the assumed nature of volumetric costs of water at the WA-level which include resource and 
environmental costs. Under the private perspective, having negative WP means irrigation has 
negative impacts on production levels and actors would spontaneously avoid water use in such 
circumstances. However, we raised the cost the WA has to face to pump water into the network to 
represent external costs. Therefore, a negative WP should be interpreted as a signal of the fact that 
in the business as usual conditions irrigation is not sustainable under the societal perspective, even 
if it is profitable for actors in the district. Nevertheless, because we made strong assumptions on 
the total cost of water, such conclusions cannot be made and WP values per-se are not reliable; in 
the scope of this research, the key focus is on the dynamics of WP. To further understand the effects 
of not including external costs in the decision environment, we have run a separate simulation. This 
helps to understand the differences in decision dynamics between a situation where cost of water 
is the only bill the WA has to pay and a situation with the assumed total cost of water. The results 
of the simulation are compared to the WP when all actors implement the PP or the RP. As can be 
seen from Figure 23, WP evolves with TFs as in the previous two scenarios. However, the maximum 
WP values are far from being comparable to the RP. Accordingly, given the small cost of water, the 
WA finds it more profitable to use water in excess than risking revenues and implement the RP. This 
is especially evident in September-October when information is never implemented because never 
profitable under the actors’ private perspective. 
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Figure 23: WP if no opportunity costs are considered  
4.7 Discussion 
In this paper we developed a behavioral model capable of representing the decision between 
inefficient but riskless irrigation plans or ICT-aided efficient irrigation plans with uncertain 
outcomes. The complex uncertainty settings involved in new ICT-information implementation are 
framed distinguishing between risk and ambiguity. This allowed to treat separately the probabilistic 
estimations provided by the ICT, which are exogenous and common between DMs, and the 
subjective perceptions on the ICT reliability. This separation opens the possibility to model the 
evolving of ambiguity over time as DMs get familiar with the new technology.  
In literature, several learning models have been proposed to describe how familiarity takes 
place as new evidences become available in time. However, these models cannot be applied in our 
context for one of the following reasons: (i) they refer to data-generating problems, where the mere 
repetition of a test allows to objectively solve ambiguity; or (ii) they are developed to account for 
production technologies, where performance can be quantitatively measured. For these reasons we 
developed a new learning model where, at the end of each TF, the DM gets a binary signal from the 
environment. This signal describes whether information has been correct or not. It is used to update 
 100 
the prior II Order PDF on ICT reliability to obtain a posterior PDF, according to the updating model 
developed. With the passing of TFs, if the ICT proves to be reliable, ambiguity lowers and, with it, 
the variance in the II Order PDF. This will help ambiguity-averse DMs in ICT-information 
implementation.  
Because behavioral attitudes under uncertainty are subjective, there will be differences 
among DMs in the time when they get familiar with the ICT and implement its information. Up until 
the time when every actor is not familiar with the ICT, differential ambiguous perceptions will cause 
un-coordinated WU in the district. By applying the model to a numerical example, we highlighted 
how this can undermine ICT benefits. Specifically, we considered two main scenarios assuming an 
accurate ICT and attitudes toward uncertainties being constant in time. Scenarios revealed that poor 
coordination among actors can not only cause allocative inefficiencies, but also drought losses at 
the farm level, with negative WP values. The issue is further exacerbated if we relax the assumption 
of constant attitudes between actors. 
In both scenarios we see ambiguity and poor coordination between actors to undermine 
benefits form ICT. However, this is true only in the first TFs when actors have few or no insights on 
ICT reliability. If they were allowed to gain experience, considering the learning behavior 
hypothesized, eventually, they would observe the same performance. As a result, actors’ actions 
will get coordinated by information provision on its own. This way, high WP values can be reached 
thanks to efficient ICT-aided irrigation plans. However, the learning process takes some time, an 
issue which will cause inefficiencies in the use of water at the district level. Further, with the 
modelled behavior WU and WP never reach the optimal values achievable when all actors 
implement the RP because, even after they get familiar with the ICT, RA remains. This makes actors 
willing to use water in excess to get rid of part of the risk specified by the ICT. 
The limitations of these results are in the model’s assumptions and simplifications. These are 
required by the complexity of the uncertainty settings. The first limitation is in the payoff function 
which includes only volumetric costs. This simplification is driven by the fact that costs for 
machineries and in-farm delivery systems are fixed in the short term and cannot be reduced by 
efficient ICT-aided irrigation plans. Therefore, we assume that they will not be taken into account 
in the implementation decision. This is true even at the WA-level, where fixed costs for irrigation 
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network maintenance are mostly related to the characteristic of the infrastructure itself not to the 
operational volumes.  
The research makes strong assumptions on behavioral coefficients. Here risk and ambiguity 
aversion coefficients are hypothesized in absolute terms and assumed to be equal between actors. 
This simplifies reality because differences in behavior are not only due to the mere differential 
perceptions, but also to differences in attitudes, with some DMs being more averse to uncertainty 
than others. However, these assumptions allowed us to focus on ambiguity, isolating the effects 
that AA has on decisions, rather than uncertainty attitudes as a whole. Further, we assumed the 
learning behavior being dependent only on subjective attitudes and, again, it is considered to be 
constant between actors. 
Volumetric costs incorporate another limitation caused by the lacking available data. At the 
farm level we assumed the cost of water being known and proportional to the quantity of water 
used. This is not always true, especially in settings where water use is un-metered. However, other 
costs, such as fuel consumption, could be taken into account by the farmer when deciding whether 
to use less water (in light of new pieces of information) or not. At the WA-level, as assumed in the 
model, costs for water should include resource and external costs. However, such costs are difficult 
to be estimated and the available information was not sufficient; so, we hypothesized them being 
50% higher than the costs at the farm level. To assume external costs of water being proportional 
to the in-farm water cost is a significant simplification. Opportunity costs might be somehow related 
to the in-farm water costs, but environmental costs are likely to be not. Therefore, the assumption 
is simplistic and might lead to strong biases in the estimation of water costs under the WA 
perspective. Nevertheless, it was not the purpose of this paper to focus on common good 
assessment and the main governance issues highlighted by the model are still in place even with 
sensible variations in the full cost of water. In addition, we run a separate simulation to highlight 
the differences in decision dynamics between a situation where the cost of water is made only by 
the water bill and a situation with the assumed total cost of water. 
The main limitation of the model is in assuming that DMs can judge if information received 
was correct and in simplifying this judgment with a binary signal. With weather-related ICT, the DM 
might find difficulties in the ex-post assessment of information reliability. Climate parameters are 
hard to measure by DMs: multiple sources of information might be misleading and quantitative 
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comparisons between forecasts and observations are frequently impossible at the end-user level. 
This can cause relevant elements of subjectivity in DMs’ judgements on the signals received after 
each TF. However, this phenomenon will only be relevant in the first TFs and, as the number of TFs 
increases, its impact will be negligible. Therefore, we can still consider that, when DMs are 
completely familiar with the ICT, their judgements on ICT reliability will be comparable. Moreover, 
in case of differences in judgements, the issues of poor governance highlighted in this paper will be 
further emphasized.  
Finally, the model considers ordinary settings for water management, with no constraints in 
terms of water availability. It would be interesting to develop the model by including DMs’ behavior 
with extreme events such as droughts. In these conditions, decision payoffs are characterized by 
heavy tailed distributions where knowing only the expected state would lead to strong 
underestimation of downside risks. At this end, information on distribution’s skewness would allow 
DM to be better able to plan their action consistently with the climate risks (Li, Xu and Zhu 2018). 
In such settings, it is evident how ICT would play a significant role; however, the impact of ambiguity 
can be expected to be significant too. Accordingly, the DM would not only doubt the probability of 
the average state, but also the shape of the whole distribution, given its relevance for the decision. 
This would require to further develop the model to relax the assumptions of normality in first and 
II Order PDFs and account for negatively skewed distributions of payoffs with climate shocks 
4.8 Conclusions and policy advice 
Despite being simplified, the model developed is capable of providing a complete picture of 
the impacts that subjective behavior under ambiguity has in undermining ICT potentials for efficient 
water management in irrigation districts. Ambiguity is found to be limiting ICT implementation 
because ambiguity-averse DMs find disutility from being exposed to the un-measurable uncertainty 
generated by not knowing ICT reliability. Further, through an empirical example, we showed that, if 
actors’ decisions on ICT implementation are not coordinated, allocative inefficiencies and 
production losses can occur. Both of the above issues can only be solved thanks to the process of 
familiarity. By allowing the DM to gain experience on ICT reliability, he would solve his ambiguous 
perceptions and put information into action. Then, when all actors get familiar with the ICT, their 
action will get coordinated according to their observations. However, the process of familiarity can 
take time; this period might further discourage ICT uptake. Accordingly, if in a TF the DM implements 
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information to save water, but his efforts get vanished due to those who decide to implement the 
PP, in the next TF he will be more unwilling take the RP. This would hinder a vicious circle and 
underlines the need for policy interventions.  
Uncertainty-management policies would be needed to lower ambiguity on ICT reliability, 
speeding up the process of familiarity. This can be done by providing ambiguity-reducing 
information on the technology’s performance (Ross et al. 2012) and allowing DMs to directly 
experience the reliability of the ICT trough demos and demonstration events. Having hands on the 
new technology, without necessarily implementing it at DM’s own expenses, would allow users to 
gain information on ICT reliability.  
Policies for efficient water governance would be needed too. Here, the main aim would be 
to avoid excess-use of water by some farmers, which might cause production losses to others. At 
this end, the only available tool would be to meter water consumption at the farm level and provide 
sanctions in case of excess-use. Nevertheless, this is possible just in few cases because the majority 
of irrigation networks are made of open-air canals where water consumption cannot be metered to 
implement volumetric pricing systems (Lika et al. 2016). In such conditions if the WA imposed to 
farmers the use of the ICT, it would not have any tool to assess whether information had actually 
been implemented or not. As a result, farmers downstream the network would remain subjected to 
the risk of water un-availability due to excess-use of water upstream. Given the risk of the sector to 
not exploit ICT because of these barriers, we believe to be a priority to further invest in ICT 
development to maximize the capabilities of these tools and to further disseminate their potentials. 
This would help fostering ICT uptake with a bottom-up approach, given the absence of policy tools 








5.1 Summary of results 
The thesis started considering the potentialities of ICT but also acknowledging the fact that 
ICTs cannot always be beneficial to irrigation management and even if ICT-information can provide 
benefits, there are constraints. To help understanding the problem, we distinguished between two 
classes of constraints limiting ICT adoption and ICT-benefits in irrigated agriculture. On the one 
hand, we identified with restrictions to information usability those constraints which occur when 
the ICT provides information that cannot be implemented or it is not profitable if implemented. 
Such restrictions cannot be overcome because they are intrinsic characteristics of the decision 
environment. On the other hand, we defined barriers to the achievement of ICT-benefits those 
constraints which can be overcome by: (i) modifying ICT-information to meet DMs’ needs; (ii) 
adapting decision processes to implement information and achieve higher performances or (iii) 
providing ambiguity reducing information to solve behavioral barriers.  
In the literature, there are several studies addressing the topic of ICT implementation in 
agriculture and water management (Jeuland et al. 2018; Meza et al. 2008). Nevertheless, results are 
contradictory, and none provides a comprehensive assessment addressing, with a holistic approach, 
the whole decision environment. In particular, to the best of authors’ knowledge, no study was 
found addressing decisions at the WA-level and the issues of ambiguity and AA. 
In this context, we deeply analyzed the decision environment around the choice for ICT 
implementation to aid irrigation management in the process of digitalization. The ambition of the 
thesis was to develop new decision models to fill the knowledge gaps on ICT implementation and 
answer the need for evidence-based policy advice. Specifically, we aimed at answering the need of 
evidences on information usability, on potential economic benefits from ICT and on barriers to the 
achievement of such benefits. To do so, the research has been carried out in three interconnected 
but separate parts. (1) The first is a literature review aimed at understanding the key issues for ICT 
adoption and at drawing the objectives and foundations on which to develop decision models to aid 
 105 
the sector. (2) In the second part of the research, we addressed the issues of restrictions to 
information usability and quantitatively estimated potential economic benefits from the ICT-
informed decision process of irrigation management at the WAs level. Finally, (3) in the third part, 
we developed a behavioral model to assess the extent to which behavioral barriers under ambiguity 
have in undermining ICT potentials for efficient water management in irrigation districts.  
(1) Results from the literature review highlighted how ICT benefits are strongly context 
dependent. ICT-information will only be usable when its content answers DMs’ needs 
(Furman et al. 2011) and its form is compatible with technical restrictions (Vogel et al. 2017). 
Further, many works underline how subjective behavioral barriers are capable of 
compromising ICT implementation and ICT-benefits. The review also allowed to build the 
theoretical foundations for new behavioral decision models of ICT adoption under 
uncertainties in irrigation management. Here we introduce the concept of ambiguity. This 
arises from a lack of knowledge on information reliability and expresses the degree of 
confidence the DM puts on the risk estimations provided by the ICT. The uncertainty framing 
proposed allows to model the process of familiarity which occurs as the DM gains experience 
on the ICT. Familiarity is expected to play a key role in the ICT adoption decision as it favors 
uncertainty-averse DMs in ICT-information implementation. 
(2) To answer to the issues of restrictions to information usability and unclear ICT-benefits, in 
the second paper we developed a theoretical model, based on BDT. Results from the 
implementation of the model to the case study allowed to estimate potential benefits from 
ICT-aided decision process of irrigation management at the WA-level. This is subjected to 
high variability in spatial and temporal distributions. The former variability is caused by 
differences in land use, where, with permanent or high added value crops, technical barriers 
or the high stakes in the decisions do not allow ICT implementation. Temporal variability is 
caused by the fluctuation of water savings during time along the irrigating season; when no 
rain is forecasted, savings are low. Over variability, benefits are also characterized by barriers 
of the decision environment which are capable of compromising information usability. In the 
specific context analyzed, the most relevant constraint is in the decision power of the WA. 
Here, the WA cannot act upon information received before the irrigating season because it 
cannot influence land allocation of permanent crops in the medium term. Moreover, due to 
the characteristics of the supply network, the WA is not able to precisely allocate water 
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according to needs. This limits ICT-benefits because of missed water savings opportunities. 
Finally, results proved how information form and quality affect its usability. Especially in 
irrigated agriculture, decisions follow the seasonal pace, therefore, it is important that 
messages are delivered at the right time during the decision process. With regards to the 
quality of ICT-information, a specific sensitivity analysis was carried out to show its relevance 
and the benefits from improvements in accuracy.  Given the high stakes involved in irrigation 
management, it is fundamental that new ICTs provide information with the accuracy needed 
by the specific target decisions. 
(3) Quality of information and ICT perceived reliability have been the core of the third part of 
the thesis. Here, we developed a behavioral model capable of representing the decision 
between inefficient but riskless irrigation plans or ICT-aided efficient irrigation plans with 
uncertain outcomes. The model allowed to account for perceptions on ICT reliability and 
attitudes toward uncertainty and showed how differential ambiguous perceptions can 
undermine ICT benefits. To assess the extent to which subjective behavior can compromise 
the efficiency of ICT aided irrigation plans, we applied the model to a case study. Here, we 
considered two main scenarios assuming an accurate ICT and attitudes toward uncertainties 
being constant in time. Scenarios revealed that poor coordination among actors can not only 
cause allocative inefficiencies, but also drought losses at the farm level. However, this is true 
only in the first TFs when actors have few or no insights on ICT reliability. If they were allowed 
to gain experience on it, their actions would eventually get coordinated and the potentials 
of ICT achieved.  
5.2 Limitations and future research 
Modelling decision processes for irrigation management under uncertainty is extremely 
complex. This posed limits in the results and in the models’ capability to represent real-life decisions. 
Three main limitations are caused by three distinct sources of complexity: (1) uncertainty framing; 
(2) peculiarities of the irrigation sector; (3) subjective behavior of farmers and WA.  
(1) Uncertainty framing: uncertainty on its own is unclear and its structure and impacts are 
often debated (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). This is highlighted by the numerous theories 
developed in the economic literature, often one theory in contrast with the other. In this 
research we provided a representation of uncertainty where there is a clear separation 
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between risk, which is exogenous and captured with the accuracy of the ICT, and ambiguity 
which is a characteristic of the DM’s subjective belief. This is a simplification of real decision 
processes, where uncertainty is not dichotomic and its multiple forms might be indistinctly 
perceived by DMs. Here, the theory of ambiguity and AA developed by Ellsberg (1961) was 
chosen by the authors without any empirical evidence. This might cause over-estimation of 
the impacts that uncertainty-aversion has on the decisions. On the one hand, other theories 
might be better explaining reality and further research carrying out comparative 
experimental tests would be useful to assess the theoretical background most suitable to 
represent behavior toward ICTs. On the other hand, the theory of AA is the only which allows 
to support the modelling of decision dynamics on ICT implementation occurring along the 
process of familiarity. Because we believe familiarity to be a key target for policies, we 
consider the theory of AA the most useful in representing the uncertainty settings of the 
study. Accordingly, the of uncertainty which is risk is hard to be modified because intrinsic 
to the decision environment. For example, risk can be due to: (i) the accuracy of the ICT, 
which in the short term cannot be raised more than what the state of the art model offers; 
(ii) or the variability of climate events, which are exogenous to the decisions. As opposite, 
ambiguity can be lowered in the short term by allowing DMs experiencing with the ICT and 
building knowledge on the ICT reliability. At this end, policies have the capability to ease the 
process of familiarity, speeding up information uptake. 
(2) Peculiarities of the irrigation sector: the complexity of the sector adds further issues, which 
required simplifications. Irrigation management is peculiar and involves numerous 
disciplines, some knowledge of which is needed to understand decisions. This is confirmed 
by the multidisciplinary background of many WAs’ boards and by the multiple stakeholders 
involved in the decisions. For example, we accounted for elements of hydraulics, where the 
WA must guarantee a threshold of minimum flow in canals and precise allocation is not 
feasible. However, because of the complexity of the systems we had to overlook other 
aspects of the decision environment and this might have caused biases on the estimation of 
ICT-benefits. Between these, in all models we overlooked or simplified environmental 
externalities, despite their relevance in the area where case studies are located (Cavazza et 
al. 2017). If research would be developed to estimate ICT-impacts on environmental 
variables, further support to ICT development could be motivated thanks to the resource-
efficiency of ICT-aided irrigation plans. In addition, this would support policy-
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adapting the full cost recovery principle of the Water Framework Directive (60/2000/EC) to 
the context of virtuous WAs who choose to implement ICT. The peculiarities in the decision 
environment of the irrigation sector are also extremely variable between WAs due to 
differences in climate, land use, existing infrastructures and decision-making flexibility. 
Therefore, decision problems for irrigation management are local-specific. This poses limits 
to the models’ applicability in different contexts and to the generalization of results; which 
would rather benefit of a wider testing exercise in areas with radically different decision-
making conditions. 
(3) Subjective behavior of farmers and WA: issues in modelling decisions on ICT information 
implementation are exacerbated when assumptions on the rationality of DMs’ behavior are 
relaxed. Although being extremely relevant in affecting decisions, subjective behavior is 
complex and, to be represented in decision processes, it requires specific modelling 
techniques. In the literature there is ample variety of modelling approaches to represent 
DM’s behavior when he is making decisions under uncertainty. Many model’s applications 
are available highlighting the better performance of a model over another in a specific 
context (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). Despite representing real life decisions with a 
sufficient degree of reliability, every solution proposed is significantly simplifying reality. 
Accordingly, combinations in behavioral traits are infinite and defining one behavioral 
pattern which fits for more than one DM implies to take the stereotype of the average DM 
and assume it fits for all actors in the same decision process. Moreover, behavior is driven 
by perceptions and attitudes which are difficult to be elicited because very context 
dependent (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014). For these reasons, in the first model, where we 
estimated ICT benefits, we assumed that the WA is rational when making choices on ICT-
information implementation. This is done by the majority of work carried out on this topic 
(Aker et al. 2016) and allowed us to focus on the technicalities of the decision process, so 
that a better picture of information usability and potential benefits could be drawn. Despite 
the limits in all behavioral models, if not capable of faithfully representing reality, they can 
still provide better understanding of decision processes. Therefore, we modelled subjective 
behavior in the third part of the thesis to gain a better picture of its impacts on ICT-benefits. 
Here, the focus was not on attitudes per-se, but on the relative degree of uncertainty 
aversion between actors in an irrigation district. Accordingly, in the numerical 
implementation of the model, we made assumptions on all behavioral parameters. 
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Therefore, results provide a representation of the dynamics of the decisions and do not 
assess the real actors’ behavior. To gain a better picture of behavior in the decision process, 
the model would benefit from experiments aimed at eliciting the coefficients of uncertainty 
aversion and perceptions toward ICT reliability. Several experimental games are available in 
literature, between these, the one developed by Attanasi et al. (Attanasi et al. 2014) is the 
most powerful to elicit AA in a way suitable to the modelling framework of this research. By 
calibrating the model with elicited parameters, its output would deliver results which could 
be better simulating the decisions. These results could be employed to design incentives 
aimed at compensating actors for their effort in bearing new uncertainties to save water. 
Despite the above described limitations, together with the ones mentioned in each chapter 
of the present research, the results provided answers to many uncertainties on ICT adoption for 
irrigation management. The models allowed to highlight the main issues which hinder ICT 
implementation and ICT-benefits and provided an estimation of the potentialities of such tools. Both 
the models and the consideration derived from their implementation can be extended to the 
broader implementation of technologies in precision agriculture. Here, the use of new tools is 
widespread, but uncertainties on the real performances or reliability still affect implementation 
decisions. Further, the methodology proposed can be considered replicable in many other 
agricultural sectors where the digitalization process is taking place. Between these, we consider 
particularly relevant the topics of: (i) result-based payments to compensate farmers for the 
provision of ecosystem services and (ii) weather-indexed insurances developed on the basis of 
agrometeorological models to provide new opportunities for risk management. Environmental 
uncertainties cause information asymmetries between farmers and the regulator, in case of result-
based payments (Derissen and Quaas 2013), or between farmers and the insurance company in case 
of weather indexed insurances (Vroege, Dalhaus and Finger 2019). ICT-information provision would 
have a potential key role in lowering uncertainties, while allowing the parts to be to be in the same 
informational settings. This is true for both result-based payment, where platforms can disseminate 
to the supplier and the regulator information on the current ecosystem status (Birge and Herzon 
2019), and index-insurance, where ICTs allow to increase transparency and real time monitoring of 
losses  (Ceballos, Kramer and Robles 2019). Nevertheless, the parts involved in the development of 
these tools might be unwilling to implement ICTs as they benefit from such asymmetries. Further, 
if lack of knowledge on the platform’s reliability occurs, there will be differences in ambiguity 
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perceptions. The impact of asymmetries in perceptions can be expected to lower the economic 
efficiency of these new insurance or policy tools.  
5.3 Policy implications 
The present dissertation was motivated by the need of evidences to support policy-makers 
in the design of new schemes to guide irrigated agriculture in unlocking ICT potentials. The results 
answered to this need and highlighted how to act in favor of the Digital irrigated agriculture. At this 
end, policy implications can be divided in three main categories: (1) ICT-development policies; (2) 
uncertainty-management policies and (3) agricultural and water policies. These are motivated by 
the potential economic benefits from ICT-aided irrigation plans and should favor an efficient 
digitalization process. 
(1) ICT-development policies are needed to overcome issues of information usability and boost 
ICT-potentials. Many ICTs offer discrete technology components without providing any 
support to adapt the technology itself to real decision processes. The simple information 
provision is not sufficient to allow its implementation because of local specificities in the 
end-user’s information environment. This is especially true for irrigation management, 
where climate and technical elements can vary significantly between decision contexts and 
can hinder ICT-information implementation. At this end, ICT are suggested to aim at 
delivering information tailored to farmers’ or WAs’ specific needs (Furman et al. 2011). 
However, most of ICT projects are characterized by a top down technological development 
where platforms are designed without involving end-users (Rotz et al. 2019). This causes 
phenomena such as the  “loading dock” (Cash et al. 2006) where end-users are provided 
with relevant climate information which has no use in reality because its form is 
incompatible with actual decision making (Vogel et al. 2017). Further, this approach feeds 
skepticism toward ICT reliability, when DMs have never experienced the new platform (Rotz 
et al. 2019). Rather than a top down approach to ICT development, a bottom up involvement 
of farmers and WAs is suggested. If ICT developers gathered more information and 
feedbacks from end-users, they would be better assured that barriers to information 
usability are overcame. However, a participatory ICT development process is likely to be 
more complex, to be longer and to incur in higher costs. At this end, policy intervention is 
advised to facilitate the process, because public institutions have the role and the capability 
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to favor a better use of existing knowledge (Cash et al. 2006). The suggestion is to implement 
policy tools to help private initiative facing the high transaction costs of ICT implementation 
jointly with end users. At this end, Operational Groups funded by the Rural Development 
Programme (RDP) are a good example, bringing together different stakeholders with 
farmers.  Similarly, the RDP’s subsidies to investments on innovation implementation can be 
a powerful tool to directly finance investments on new platforms or indirectly by means of 
cross-compliance.   
(2) Uncertainty-management policies would be needed to lower ambiguity on ICT reliability, 
speeding up the process of familiarity. Once new platforms are brought to the market, it 
would be ideal to offer long trials or demonstrative events. Rather than a plug and play 
approach, these initiatives would allow end-users to better understand how information can 
be implemented and to gain experience on ICT reliability. Having hands on the platform, 
without necessarily implementing its information at DM’s own expenses, would lower 
ambiguous perceptions and potentially foster the diffusion of ICTs. In addition, even after 
ICT adoption, DMs can be encouraged in starting to use the new platforms for informative 
purposes before attaching real decision making on it; this way they would experience ICT 
reliability without risking losses. As we modelled in this research, ICT-information 
implementation often implies moving from inefficient PPs with sure outcome, to efficient 
ICT-informed RP with uncertain outcomes. Here, if a DM is willing to bear such uncertainties 
to save water, he would be needing support in his virtuous choice. Accordingly, even after 
ambiguity is solved, uncertainty remains in the form of risk. Therefore, ex-post risk coping 
policies would be helpful to compensate losses at the WA’s or farms’ level when the ICT 
failed in its predictions.  
(3) Agricultural and water policies instruments are suggested to be evaluated also with respect 
to their effects on risk perception to promote ex-ante risk management solutions to increase 
the sector’s resilience. Between these, at the farm level, policies could favor investments in 
resource-efficient crops and irrigation systems; at the WA level, there could be favored: 
reservoirs, to face longer periods of scarcity; and investment in the irrigation network to 
allow efficient water allocation between districts. Policies for efficient water governance 
would be needed too. Here, the main aim would be to avoid excess-use of water by some 
farmers, which might cause production losses to others. Further, we have to consider that 
the share of risk estimated by the ICT is subjected to climate variability. This complicates ICT-
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informed decisions with CC, because every time the share of risk varies, the DM’s expected 
utility from information implementation varies too. This issue will require DMs to take time 
to analyze case by case the uncertainty settings, before deciding. Therefore, policies for 
digitalization are suggested to account for such extra time and compensate adopters for 
their decision. 
Finally, to clarify the settings in which specific policies are suggested to be implemented and 
which actor to target, in Table 9 we propose a schematic representation of the policy suggestions 
arising from the thesis. Here, we consider the combinations between high or low levels of risk and 
ambiguity affecting ICT-aided irrigation management decisions. If uncertainty is low because of low 
levels of risk and ambiguity, policy intervention can be limited at promoting ICTs and favoring 
familiarity or in providing incentives to adoption or incentives to water use reduction. The target for 
such policies can be limited to WAs, because they can implement ICT-information in their districts 
with low risks for farmers. On the other hand, if risk is high while ambiguity low, the target for 
policies is represented by farmers. Here, if the ICT is implemented at one of the two decision levels, 
farmers risk production losses due to the high variability of climate events, therefore ex-post 
compensation of such losses would be helpful. To better predict climate variability, investments on 
the accuracy of information would be useful too. As opposite, if it is ambiguity high while risk low, 
the target is both the WA and farmers. Both would benefit from ambiguity reduction initiatives, 
making them be more inclined in information implementation thanks to the process of familiarity. 
However, because of the high ambiguity, farmers are also exposed to losses caused by poor 
governance. Therefore, they would need ex-post compensation in case of in-farm losses due to 
excess-use in other farms. Finally, when uncertainty is high due to high risk and ambiguity, the policy 
maker is suggested to further investigate on the convenience of information implementation. As 
highlighted in this research, in not all decision processes ICT-information implementation is 
profitable. Here, rather than the mere promotion of ICT illustrated in Table 9, other insurance 
schemes or policies aimed at supporting irrigation management are expected to be more suitable. 
Otherwise, if uncertainty can be lowered trough information provision all the policy tools described 
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The present doctoral dissertation rose in a context where CC is posing new challenges to 
irrigated agriculture. Here, weather patterns are increasingly unpredictable and highly variable, 
while climate shocks such as prolonged droughts are more frequent. Decreased predictability 
together with increased variability are posing significant uncertainties in decision processes and are 
exacerbating the sector’s vulnerability to CC. 
Many scholars agree on the capability of ICTs to help facing such problems by lowering 
uncertainty and improving decision processes through the provision of relevant information. 
Accordingly, in the Digital agriculture revolution we are living in, numerous innovations contribute 
to modify the decision environment by lowering uncertainty. Many examples are found in literature 
showing the ICT potentials to favor adaptation to CC. However, together with such potentialities 
new challenges emerge due to barriers to ICT-information implementation. This is especially true 
for irrigated agriculture which is one of the sectors most vulnerable to climate-related uncertainties. 
Irrigation management is characterized by peculiar decision processes where several barriers can 
undermine information usability and ICT benefits. 
Given the risk of the sector to not exploit ICT potentials we considered a priority to support 
irrigated agriculture in the Digital water journey. At this end, we analyzed the most critical issues to 
ICT development and defined a theoretical framework which provides a complete picture of the 
uncertainties around ICT-information implementation. On this framework we based two decision 
models which helped to understand the decision dynamics of ICT-information implementation for 
irrigation management. The first model allowed to highlight restrictions to information usability and 
to estimate ICT-benefits. The second model was developed to assess the impacts that subjective 
behavior under uncertainty has in undermining ICT potentials. 
The capability of decision models was then proved by two separate empirical examples. 
Results confirmed the hypothesis of ICT potentials, but underlined that benefits are extremely 
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variable and subject to constraints. These are relative to the decision environment, to the form and 
quality of ICT-information and to the behavior of DMs. Within the decision environment, technical 
elements condition information usability; between these the most relevant are in the water delivery 
systems, land use and the WA’s decision power. Because irrigation management decisions follow 
the seasonal pace and have high payoffs at stake, information must be provided at the right time 
and with the needed accuracy to be relied on. Finally, subjective behavior can limit ICT-benefits both 
because ambiguity-aversion lowers EU from ICT-informed actions and because irrigation efficiency 
is conditioned by all actors’ actions for the management of the resource. 
The main limitations of the results are caused by complexities in the decision processes of 
irrigation management and in the nature of the uncertainty settings. Complexities required many 
assumptions and simplifications, both in the decision environment and in the DMs’ behavior. 
Despite the simplifications, models are still capable of representing the dynamics of decision 
processes and results allowed to provide policy-makers important advices to aid the sector. At this 
end, we highlighted the need of ICT-development policies to overcome barriers and maximize ICT 
potentials. Uncertainty-management policies are also suggested to lower the ambiguity raising from 
a lack of knowledge on information reliability and to support DMs when they choose to implement 
ICT-information and bare new sources of risk. 
To conclude, thanks to the holistic approach adopted in this research to study ICT-informed 
decision processes for irrigation management, we can confirm that ICTs can be a viable tool to face 
new challenges posed by CC. However, the exploitation of such new tools by irrigated agriculture is 
not self-fulfilling. First of all, to ease the digitalization process, it is important to disseminate not 
only the capabilities of ICTs, but also their real limits and accuracy. This is expected to help avoiding 
false expectations which feed ambiguity and skepticism. In addition, the process is characterized by 
barriers which can be targeted and solved by policy makers; at this end, further research is 
suggested to efficiently design new policies and develop new ICT platforms. Finally, the authors wish 
to underline the natural evolution of ICTs which is through the provision of new pieces of 
information which will be more reliable and easier to be implemented. This is expected to allow 
irrigated agriculture to have always more opportunities to lower uncertainties affecting 
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Appendix 1: Simplification for the CE computation 
In this section we provide the extensive proof behind the simplification used to determine 
the CE of the RP starting from the expected utility equation of Klibanoff et al. (Klibanoff et al. 2005):  
𝐸𝑈_,^ s𝑓(𝑥1|xxyz)t = 𝔼∆𝜙 »𝑢 s𝔼𝑺𝑓(𝑥1|xxyz)t¼ = ' 𝜙 »𝐸𝑈_ s𝑓(𝑥1|xxyz)t¼ µ s𝜋)𝑥1̂*t 𝑑𝜋)𝑥1̂* 
For simplicity in notations we have the following elements: 𝑥1 = 𝑠; xxyz = 𝑥. In the first step 
we assume negative exponential utility functions and normal distributions for both risk and 
ambiguity. By making explicit the distribution function of 𝜋(𝑠), with 𝜎1 being the standard deviation 
and µ the average, is we obtain the following set of equation: 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = '−𝑒_](1|7)𝜋(𝑠)𝑑𝑠  
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = '−𝑒_](1|7) 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒LM(](1|7)D­v )e𝑑𝑠 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −' 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒](1|7)eDeM](1|7)DM_­e](1|7)M­ve 𝑑𝑠 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −' 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒](1|7)eDeM](1|7))D_­ve*)D_­ve*
e)D_­ve*eM­ve 𝑑𝑠 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −' 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒(](1|7)D_­ve)eDe)D_­ve*
eM­ve 𝑑𝑠 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −' 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒(](1|7)D_­ve)eDe(De)_­ve*eMD_­ve)M­e 𝑑𝑠 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −' 1½2𝜋𝜎1 𝑒(](1|7)D_­ve)e_­e(_­veMD)M­e 𝑑𝑥 
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𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −𝑒_sDLM_­vet ' 1√2𝜋𝜎 𝑒LM»](1|7)(D_­ve)­ ¼e𝑑𝑥 
𝐸𝑈_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −𝑒_sDLM_­vet = −𝑒_s𝔼𝑺](1|)LM_­vet 
Now, because the inverse of the risk preference function is the certain equivalent associated 
to the risky outcome, the CE is determined as follows: 
𝐶𝐸_(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = 𝔼𝑺𝑓(𝑠|x) − 12 𝑟𝜎1M 
Now we consider also ambiguity and repeat the same procedure to determine expected 
utility under risk and ambiguity: 
𝐸𝑈_,^(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = −𝑒^s𝔼𝑺](1|)LM_­vet 
This is followed by the associated certain equivalent: 
𝐶𝐸_,^(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)) = 𝔼∆(𝔼𝑺𝑓(𝑠|x) − 12 𝑟𝜎1M) − 12𝑎𝜎∆M  
Appendix 2: Simplification for the computation of the optimal water 
volume 
In this section we provide the extensive proof behind the simplification which is used to 
assess the optimal water volume to be used under the DM’s behavioral perspective. The 
simplification starts considering the formulation of the CE determined in the previous section. To 
aid the comprehension, we follow the same notation of the previous section and the following: 𝑅 =LM 𝑟𝜎0(1)M ; 𝐴 = LM 𝑎𝜎D)0(vÁ)|Pa*M ; 𝑚 = µ)𝜋(?̂?)}* = µ(𝜋(?̂?)); 	𝑝 = ∏(?̂?); 𝑅]^_`∗ f = 𝑣; 𝑐]^_`a = 𝑐. This 
helps obtaining the equation: 
𝐶𝐸)𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)* = 𝔼∆ s𝔼𝑺𝑓(𝑠|x) − LM 𝑟𝜎1Mt − LM 𝑎𝜎∆M = 𝔼∆Ã𝔼-)𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)* − 𝑅Ä − 𝐴  
Now, because the model of Klibanoff et al. (Klibanoff et al. 2005) is based on the assumption 
that second order acts in the space ∆ yield the same CE as first order acts in the space 𝑆, we have 
that: 
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𝔼∆Ã𝔼-)𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)*Ä = 𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)} = 𝑉(𝑋) − 𝑐𝑥 
Therefore, we obtain the following CE: 
𝐶𝐸)𝑓(𝑠|𝑥)* = 𝑉(𝑋) − 𝑐𝑥 − 𝑅 − 𝐴 
Now, if we consider the equilibrium where the DM is indifferent between the RP and the PP, 
we have: 
𝑔(𝑋) = 𝐶𝐸(𝑓(𝑠|𝑥))	𝑉(𝑋) − 𝑐𝑋 = 𝑉(𝑥) − 𝑐𝑥 − 𝑅 − 𝐴 
𝑋 = 𝑥 + 𝐴 + 𝑅𝑐  
Where X can be interpreted as the water demand from the DM, accounting for uncertainty 
and his behavior toward it. By employing the above equation, we can obtain the following 
simplifications considering different alternatives of perceptions and attitudes: 
• Uncertainty-neutral DM: 
𝑋 = 𝑥 
• Ambiguity-neutral DM: 𝑋 = 𝑥 + 𝑅𝑐  
Appendix 3: Relation between irrigation and crop production  
To estimate the relation between irrigation and crop production, we firstly consider 
evapotraspiration (𝐸𝑇) being function of irrigation (𝑥). Although, studies in agronomics proved the 
polinomial nature in the relation between the two quantities (Linker et al. 2016), we assume a linear 
and constant relation. This is a strong approximation forced by the lacking available data. To 
determine the crop production as function of irrigation we employ a simple modification of the 
classic production function introduced in FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper No. 33 (Doorenbos and 
Kassam 1979): 
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𝑌P(𝑥P) = 𝑌P∗[1 − 𝑘ÈR(1 − 𝐸𝑇P(𝑥P)𝐸𝑇P∗ )] 𝑌PL(𝑥PL)𝑌PL∗  
where:	𝑥P e 𝑥PL are the decisional variables,  that is, respectively the quantity of irrigation 
water at time t and the quantity of irrigation water at time: 𝑡 − 1;	𝑌P(𝑥P) and 𝑌PL(𝑥PL) are 
respectively crop productions at time 𝑡 and time 𝑡 − 1; 𝑌P∗ e 𝑌PL∗  are respectively optimal crop 
productions at time 𝑡 and time 𝑡 − 1; 𝑘ÈR  is the crop coefficient which helps to convert 
evapotranspiration in crop production; as said, 𝐸𝑇(𝑥P) represents the crop’s evapotranspiration at 
time 𝑡; 𝐸𝑇P∗ represents the crop’s evapotranspiration at time 𝑡 but withoud stresses from lacking 
irrigation. The proposed equation differs from its original form because it accounts for the impacts 
that prior drought stresses have on the optimal crop production in the current stage.  
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